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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to expand on the rather limited literature that has 
been written on the possibility, and impact, of a relationship forming between criminal 
and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. There is a significant amount of 
literature that has been written to address the individual topics of criminal organizations, 
terrorist organizations, and human smuggling. However, there has been little effort at 
addressing these areas collectively and in a scholarly manner.  
Frequently, human smuggling organizations will attempt to bribe or corrupt 
border officials into turning a blind-eye to carloads or even busloads of illegal aliens 
crossing the border (Kahn, 2006; Former Border Patrol Agent, 2008). Furthermore, there 
are numerous recent instances where border officials and those assigned to assist border 
officials have allowed vehicles to enter the U.S. that contained illegal aliens and narcotics 
(Seper, 2007; Border Officer, 2008; Archibold & Becker, 2008). There is little current 
scholarly literature that addresses new corruption efforts by criminal organizations or 
gangs to influence border agents, which leaves room for expansion on this topic.  
The scholarly literature is clear that criminal gangs like MS-13 and M-18 are 
working with criminal organizations whose primary business is human smuggling 
(Franco, 2008; Ribando, 2008, p. 4). It has been speculated that these criminal gangs 
could hire themselves out to smuggle terrorists into the U.S., but the scholarly literature is 
lacking in this area and warrants further study.  
Individually, the criminal organizations, criminal gangs, and terrorist affiliated 
groups are already established south of the U.S./Mexico border. Furthermore, it has been 
well documented that South America is a haven for numerous terrorist organizations who 
are continually recruiting and training non Mexican members (Berry et al., 2003). The 
threat of organized criminal organizations (e.g., Russian mafia or Mexican drug cartels), 
criminal gangs (e.g., MS-13 or M-18), human smuggling networks, and terrorist 
organizations (e.g., al-Qaeda, Taliban, or Hezbollah) joining forces has yet to be widely 
recognized; however, there is a potential national security threat should this relationship 
come to fruition.  
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These entities could form a strategic alliance and leverage existing narcotics, 
weapons, and human smuggling corridors that exist south of the U.S./Mexico border to 
smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S., thereby threatening U.S. interests and national 
security. For example, Shelley and Picarelli (2005) point to evidence that the Tamil 
Tigers have smuggled Sri Lankans in return for funds to support their terror operations. 
There is also evidence that the Lebanese, to include Hezbollah sympathizers, have been 
smuggled into the U.S. via Tijuana Mexico (Arillaga & Rodriguez, 2005). Once in the 
U.S., the Lebanese frequently engage in fundraising to further support Hezbollah and 
continue smuggling Lebanese migrants into the U.S.  
Because human smuggling is a billion dollar industry (Stana, 2005), the potential 
for these relationships to be formed, or for that matter may already be formed, between 
criminal and terrorist organizations will likely be financially driven with little regard for 
the potentially disastrous outcome for the U.S. The relationship between criminal gangs 
and criminal organizations engaged in human smuggling, and terrorist groups, need not 
be long-term or ideologically-based.   
Enhanced information sharing between law enforcement entities could prevent 
terrorists from being smuggled into the U.S. It is imperative that terrorist related 
information collected by the local police or sheriff be shared with federal partners and 
vice versa. By infiltrating or disrupting one or more of these entities (i.e., organized 
criminal organizations, criminal gangs, and terrorist organizations) through enhanced 
information sharing efforts, law enforcement may prevent the next terrorist from being 
smuggled into the U.S., thereby averting disastrous consequences. 
This thesis will incorporate scholarly literature, data obtained from interviewing 
senior homeland security and senior law enforcement officials with operational 
experience, and data obtained from case studies to determine how organized criminal 
organizations and terrorist organizations might form a partnership for purposes of human 
smuggling, thereby impacting national security. Specifically, this thesis will seek to 
answer whether or not there is a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations 
in terms of them cooperating to smuggle a terrorist operative across the U.S.-Mexico 
border? If not, is there a possibility of a relationship between these two entities? Lastly, 
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how can homeland security and law enforcement improve the information sharing 
process to prevent a criminal and terrorist organization from smuggling a terrorist 
operative across the U.S.-Mexico border?   
Policymakers will benefit from this thesis by making policy decisions on how best 
to prevent terrorists from being smuggled into the U.S. Furthermore, the Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and state and local officials along the 
southern border will benefit from this thesis because they may conduct enhanced queries 
on the people they apprehend relative to their personal relationships and possible 
nefarious affiliations. By conducting this research and establishing a relationship between 
these entities (i.e., organized criminal organizations and terrorist organizations), law 
enforcement personnel may utilize different tactics when they question a gang member 
they encounter, a criminal organization they survey or disrupt, and a terrorist organization 
they infiltrate.     
A. ARGUMENT 
The U.S. Federal law enforcement community considers the criminal gangs in 
Central America and Mexico as transnational criminal organizations and acknowledges 
that these gangs are involved in crimes such as human smuggling (United States, 2007). 
Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation stated that, “today gangs are more violent, more organized, and more 
widespread than ever before. They pose one of the greatest threats to the safety and 
security of all Americans” (United States, 2005a). According to the national gang threat 
assessment, criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of the crime in many 
communities, which includes alien smuggling (National Gang Intelligence Center, 2009).  
According to Kane (2006), MS-13 is flexible and mobile making them a 
formidable opponent, as well as a transnational threat. In fact, the U.S. Border Patrol has 
had a standing requirement since 2004 to collect intelligence on MS-13 (Kane, 2006). 
However, given that the intelligence collection culture is historically secret this 
information is shared sparingly between federal agencies and less so with state and local 
entities (Isaacson & O’Connell, 2002; Zegart, 2007). The end result is that law 
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enforcement has a restricted view of the available information resulting in fewer 
opportunities to identify criminal gangs who are involved in human smuggling. If we 
have as a goal to prevent terrorist attacks against our country and its interests, then we 
have to have timely, accurate, and free flowing information between all entities charged 
with achieving this goal (United States, 2008a). According to Gardner, Killebrew, 
and Cope (2009), data sharing among federal, state, and local agencies is critical to 
defeating international gangs. 
The growth of criminal gangs, and the introduction of state-supported 
Islamic terrorism into the Western Hemisphere, foreshadows the 
practically inevitable fusion of criminal gangs and terrorists within the 
borders of the United States. Countering the threat will require fusion on 
our part, as well—close coordination among military, national 
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations at all levels. (p. 73) 
There is information available from the National Gang Intelligence Center (2009) 
that indicates U.S. based gang members cross the U.S.-Mexico border for the express 
purpose of smuggling drugs and aliens from Mexico into the U.S. Furthermore, Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) has confirmed that MS-13 has been smuggling drugs and 
illegal aliens across the U.S. southern border (Kane, 2006). This is supported by Johnson 
and Muhlhausen (2005) who report that gangs like MS-13 are experts at gaining illegal 
entry into the U.S. According to the Border Patrol Field Intelligence Center, “reporting 
suggests that MS-13 is aligned with drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and 
Columbia, moving drugs through Central America” (Kane, 2006). While MS-13 may be 
aligned with drug trafficking organizations, Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal 
Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, believes that “it is unlikely that  
al-Qaeda and MS-13 would form an overt partnership for both security and ideological 
reasons” (United States, 2005a). However, a covert partnership may not be out of the 
question. 
The Washington Office on Latin America [WOLA] (2008) states that criminal 
gangs in Central and South America are plentiful and play a central role in the extreme 
violence. The violence exhibited by these criminal gangs, primarily MS-13, has earned 
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them the ability to align with organized criminal organizations to protect human 
smuggling routes into the U.S. and as a way to generate revenue (Franco, 2008).  
The violent transnational gangs of Latin America, including the Mexican 
cartels, operate with little regard for national borders. Since national 
sovereignty stops at the border, countering their activities will require, 
among other things, near-seamless integration of foreign and domestic 
intelligence programs operated by a wide variety of allied states with 
American Federal, state, and local agencies. (Gardner, Killebrew, & Cope, 
2009, p. 69) 
These gangs are similar to al-Qaeda in that they use violence and intimidation, are 
transnational, and thrive in areas where the state is weak or nonexistent (Wilson & 
Sullivan, 2007). One example of gangs exerting influence over the state is in Taiwan 
where the justice minister stated that 4–10 percent of elected officials in the legislature 
and National Assembly had gang affiliations (Shelley, 1999). 
As the U.S. continues to tighten security at the U.S.-Mexico land border, terrorists 
may seek the assistance of human smuggling organizations in order to surreptitiously 
enter the U.S. (Ordonez, 2008). Human smuggling organizations are run like a business 
and are financially driven. Because they are not concerned with the identity of their 
clients, terrorists and criminals have the ability to utilize these smuggling organizations 
as a ticket into our Nation (United States, 2005b, p. 15). Some U.S. officials worry that 
the alien smuggling routes into the U.S. could be used by the terrorists not only to enter 
the U.S. but to possibly introduce weapons into the U.S. (Dangerous desert, 2005).  
Another option for the terrorists and criminal organizations to gain undetected 
entry into the U.S. is to bribe U.S. border officials. By doing so, they essentially get a 100 
percent assurance that their “cargo” will make it into the U.S. undetected. Also, 
homeland security and law enforcement officials will likely never know what or who was 
allowed past our borders until it is too late to take any action. For example, in June 2007, 
three National Guardsmen assisting the U.S. Border Patrol were arrested for facilitating 
the entry of 24 illegal aliens in a Homeland Security leased vehicle (Seper, 2007). On 
May 16, 2008, a CBP Officer allowed vehicles to enter the U.S. land border port of Otay 
Mesa, CA. One vehicle contained 18 illegal aliens and more than 170 pounds of 
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marijuana (Border Officer, 2008). In October 2008, two brothers (former Border Patrol 
agents) were arrested for their involvement in smuggling dozens of illegal immigrants, 
mostly Mexicans and Brazilians, while on duty (Archibold & Becker, 2008).  
The good news is that there is a mechanism in place that may be able to assist 
with reducing corruption. The National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) was 
created, in part, to give the highest priority to the exchange of terrorism information with 
foreign governments (United States, 2007). The bad news is that unless and until the U.S. 
Government can gain the cooperation of the Mexican government, Mexican federal 
police, Mexican military, and Mexican state police to share intelligence and information 
on which Mexican criminal organizations are involved in bribing officials on both sides 
of the border, there will continue to be an inherent risk of corruption resulting in a 
terrorist being waved past U.S. border security officials undetected. 
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, otherwise known as the Tri-Border Area (TBA), 
are locations where criminal organizations and terrorist groups can hide in plain sight. 
The TBA is also known as an area where fraudulent documents can be easily obtained 
through corrupt government officials (Berry et al., 2003). Both the TBA and Central 
America are popular with migrants and those with terrorist ties from other countries 
because of the ability to obtain tourist visas either legally or through bribery (Terror-
Linked Migrants, 2005). For example, two foreign nationals, Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim, 
a native of Ghana and a naturalized citizen of Mexico, and Sampson Lovelace Boateng of 
Ghana were both charged with smuggling East Africans from Mexico to the U.S. 
Boateng was providing fraudulently obtained Mexican visas for travel through Africa, 
South and Central America, and then into Mexico at which point Ibrahim would smuggle 
them into the U.S. (Seper, 2007).   
Another example of visa fraud, although not at the U.S.-Mexico border, that 
demonstrates a relationship between terrorists and criminal activity involves Hezbollah. 
In 1999, Said Mohamad Harb, who was heavily involved in the North Carolina cigarette 
smuggling ring lead by Mohamad Hammoud that raised millions of dollars for 
Hezbollah, helped secure three fraudulent visas and foster three sham marriages. These 
Hezbollah supporters obtained nonimmigrant visas, which allowed them to stay in the 
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U.S. for two weeks. However, each ended up marrying a U.S. citizen immediately after 
their arrival, which allowed them to stay indefinitely. Harb also attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to bribe an immigration special agent with $10,000 so another brother 
could enter the U.S. (United States, 2006a).  
Terrorists and criminal organizations may work together but may not do so 
willingly (Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007, p. 1096). This temporary cooperative effort has 
been referred to as the “gray area” (Ponce, 2006). However, because terrorists and 
criminal organizations are typically engaged in illegal enterprises, there may be a 
willingness to work with one another in order to meet their financial needs. According to 
O’Neil (2007), they both rely on money to support their organizations. Frequently they 
require continual, and often times multiple, streams of cash flow in order to keep their 
operations running leading to behavior that is more criminal in nature. For example, the 
March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings were financed by money earned dealing in 
hashish and ecstasy. Apparently the brother of the ringleader (Jamal Ahmidan) of the 
Madrid attack was one of Morocco’s top hashish dealers. Also, the explosives used in the 
bombing were paid for by bartering hash and money (Kaplan, Fang, & Sangwan, 2005).  
Terrorists and criminal organizations are similar in that they both rely on the 
secrecy of their operations, secrecy of their membership, and secrecy of their leadership. 
Their transnational nature and use of a network structure provides them with 
organizational flexibility and enhanced efficiency (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). Also, both 
criminal and terrorist groups have been able to gain increased protection from law 
enforcement by decentralizing, which allows for clandestine movement and a higher level 
of anonymity (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002; Townsend & Mili, 2008). Furthermore, they 
both employ specialists in fraudulent documents and the movement of illicit funds 
(Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). Lastly, they both engage in drug trafficking and human 
smuggling, which is based on an established trust that is cemented by a mutual ethnic or 
cultural background (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006; Townsend & Mili, 2008).  
Absent the ability to freely share timely, accurate, actionable information, the 
ability to disrupt a partnership between a criminal and terrorist organization intent on 
smuggling operatives into the U.S. becomes much more challenging. The criminal and 
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terrorist organizations are fully aware that the U.S. and its allies are actively seeking to 
disrupt their organizations and any plans they may have to attack the U.S. and its 
interests. Therefore, criminal and terrorist organizations will do everything in their power 
to hide or disguise any possible links with one another to avoid disruption by U.S. 
authorities. The danger to U.S. security is that the terrorists and criminal organizations 
have no real concern about the outcomes of their potential relationship as long as their 
financial needs are being met. That is, if there is an agreement to cooperate on human 
smuggling efforts the focus will be on financial compensation with little regard for who 
or what (e.g., terrorist operative, weapon) they are smuggling.  
B. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used for this thesis involved personal interviews and case 
studies. The interviews were conducted telephonically and were one hour in length. 
Fifteen senior homeland security and senior law enforcement officials located along the 
southern border of the U.S. participated in the interviews. They represented the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border 
Protection Office of Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection Office of Border 
Patrol, county sheriffs, and city police. A qualitative data analysis was conducted on the 
interview data in order to reveal any themes and patterns.  
Two case examples are illustrated in detail to describe the relationship between 
criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. Scholarly literature, 
legal affidavits, and criminal indictments were reviewed and analyzed to provide a 
detailed account of these two cases. Furthermore, these two case examples were chosen 
because they illustrate the criminal behavior, terrorist affiliation, and smuggling 
operations of persons who have successfully entered the U.S. from Mexico, undetected.  
A thorough case study was conducted on the Irish Republican Army to illustrate 
how an international organization can ebb and flow between criminal and terrorist 
activity. Furthermore, this case illustrates that this behavior is passed on from generation 
to generation continuing the cycle of criminal and terrorist behavior. A summary of these 
two case examples and case study will identify the connection between criminal activity, 
terrorism, and human smuggling.  
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The first step in trying to understand the relationship between criminal and 
terrorist organizations in the context of human smuggling is to look at existing studies 
that explore the various aspects of this issue. Specifically, studies relative to human 
smuggling, criminal organizations, terrorism, and information sharing will be reviewed in 
an effort to determine a nexus between these entities.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
On the issue of the relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in the 
context of human smuggling along the U.S. border with Mexico, there are three 
categories of literature that fall within the scope of this subject. Each category includes 
scholarly papers, government reports, and newspaper articles. The three categories that 
have been identified as germane to the research question are: human smuggling, criminal 
organizations, and terrorism. A fourth category that fell within the scope of this thesis, 
which surfaced during the interview phase of this research, is information sharing that 
takes place between federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. This first hand 
account of current information sharing obstacles as well as “best practices” was extensive 
and detailed and will be discussed at length in a separate chapter.     
A. HUMAN SMUGGLING   
The literature on human smuggling contains a mix of Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports that are a few years old, reports from federal agencies (e.g., 
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security) that are fairly recent, and quite a 
few newspaper articles (e.g., Washington Times, Wall Street Journal) that are current. 
Many policy makers are concerned about the drug cartels involvement in human 
smuggling (United States, 2005b). In fact, the literature identifies several relationships 
between criminal organizations and human smuggling. For example, there are Russian 
criminal organizations engaged in a wide array of illegal activities in Mexico, which 
include alien smuggling (Miro & Curtis, 2003, p. 29). Also, Asian criminal organizations 
are active in Mexico and have partnered with the domestic (Mexican) alien smuggling 
and human trafficking rings (Miro & Curtis, 2003). The 9/11 Commission also cited 
strong concerns that human smuggling organizations and terrorists may collaborate to 
bypass detection by border officials (United States, 2005b). Furthermore, there is a 
concern that terrorists and criminals have the ability to utilize smuggling organizations as 
a ticket into our Nation (United States, 2005b, p. 15).  
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In an effort to curb human smuggling, the U.S. Government doubled the number 
of agents on the border between Mexico and the United States between 2006 and 2008. 
As Millman (2007) points out, the increased security has caused a reduction in people 
trying to cross illegally but resulted in an increase in business for professional human 
smugglers who are connected to drug smuggling organizations. In fact, Vartabedian, 
Serrano, and Marosi (2006) proposed that an increase in the number of border agents 
would result in an increase in the number of people involved in corruption. Furthermore, 
Becker (2008) has seen a rise in the number of corruption cases since the federal 
government and other law enforcement agencies have increased the number of personnel 
patrolling the border. Accordingly, from 2004–2006 over 200 public employees have 
been charged with helping move narcotics or illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican 
border (Vartabedian, Serrano, & Marosi, 2006). As more Border Patrol agents are added 
to the southwest border, the Mexican drug cartels will likely try that much harder to 
corrupt border officials (Campo-Flores et al., 2005; Becker, 2008). 
Corruption is one of the issues people face when working in close proximity with 
the southern land border between Mexico and the U.S. (Campo-Flores, Campbell, 
Kovach, & Gekas, 2007). In fact, there are numerous recent cases involving Border 
Patrol Agents and CBP Officers engaged in passing or waving through carloads and, in 
one instance, busloads of illegal aliens (Kahn, 2006; Former Border Patrol Agent, 2008).  
Despite an increase in the number of border agents along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
the Mexican drug cartels continue to be more dangerous than organized criminal 
organizations (i.e., criminal gangs and human smugglers) and are a significant threat to 
border officials along the southern border (McCaul, 2006, p. 4). T.J. Bonner, the 
president of the National Border Patrol Council, has stated that the number of assaults 
against Border Patrol agents have doubled over the past two years. These assaults are 
predominantly from the drug cartels that use violence as a way to ensure that their human 
smuggling and drug smuggling loads are protected (Seper, 2007, p. 1). 
The human smuggling routes between the U.S. and Mexico continue to pose a 
risk for terrorist exploitation and are of grave concern to policy makers. The criminal 
organizations in Mexico have developed specialized skills in human smuggling and 
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document fraud making them ripe for exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations 
seeking entry to the U.S. (Berry et al., 2003). According to Westphal (2000) document 
fraud, part of the human smuggling enterprise, generates millions of dollars annually for 
criminal organizations (Westphal, 2000). For example, one of the largest counterfeit 
organizations, known as the San German/Castorena ring, is located in Los Angeles. 
Documents produced by this one organization have turned up in 55 cities and 32 states 
according to Westphal (2000).  
Keefer (2006) believes that a relationship between human smuggling networks 
and terrorist organizations are a real possibility in today’s environment and that this 
relationship presents a threat to our national security. Davidson II (2005, p. 8) purports 
that human trafficking routes between the U.S. and Mexico are likely to be used by 
terrorists located in the Tri Border Area (TBA) of South America. Furthermore, Al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah are known to have used the TBA in South America for fund 
raising, money laundering, and drug trafficking (Berry et al., 2003). In fact, terrorist 
organizations are recruiting and training new members in South America who are 
referred to as Other Than Mexican or OTM (Nuñez-Neto, Siskin, & Viña, 2005, p. 21). 
The number of OTMs apprehended by Border Patrol (the majority along the Southwest 
border) in FY06 was 108,025. One of the risks associated with processing so many 
foreign nationals for removal from the U.S. is that the opportunity for error (e.g., not 
identifying a fake document or fake identity) is greatly increased due to the heavy 
workload (McCaul, 2006, p. 27). It is unknown how many OTM’s have successfully 
made it past border officials without capture. 
The financial gains from human smuggling and document fraud continue to be the 
driving factor for criminal organizations and gangs, with no regard for who they may be 
smuggling into the U.S. According to Stana (2005, p. 1), alien smuggling is a billion 
dollar industry and is a threat to the security of the U.S.  
B. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS  
There is a significant amount of scholarly literature, much of which has been 
written by John P. Sullivan and Louise Shelley, addressing criminal gangs that reside 
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south of the U.S.-Mexico border. They are frequently referenced in other scholarly 
articles and are among the respected experts on criminal organizations and their possible 
link to terrorism.  
The Central American region, referred to as the Northern Triangle, is comprised 
of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala and is a hotbed for criminal organizations and 
criminal gangs. Extortion is commonplace and homicide continues to rise uncontrollably. 
Both the criminal gangs and the organized criminal organizations are contributing to 
these problems. There is also a sense of lawlessness that does not discourage this type of 
behavior (WOLA, 2008, pp. 2–3). Ribando (2005) provides some data to indicate that 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (Central America) are the center of the criminal 
gang crisis. For example, the 2004 murder rate in Honduras was 45.9 per 100,000 people, 
El Salvador was 41.2 per 100,000 people, and Guatemala was 34.7 per 100,000 people. 
For the U.S. it was 5.7 per 100,000 people. This type of activity can destabilize the 
Central American region and threaten the security of the U.S.  
The two main criminal gangs that cause policy makers concern are Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18). Both groups are involved in human 
and drug smuggling and could use these same skills to smuggle terrorists into the U.S. 
(Franco, 2008). In fact, it is fairly common for a terrorist and criminal group to intersect 
when it comes to illicit activities. One example of this fact is illustrated by what occurs in 
Afghanistan due to the significant opium drug trade (Shelley, 2005). It has been reported 
that MS-13 members have been active in southern Mexico and have charged smugglers a 
fee for passing through MS-13 controlled territory. MS-13 has also worked with the 
Mexican drug cartels to carry out revenge killings (Ribando, 2008, p. 4). For example, 
there were 138 murders in El Salvador in January 2005, 79 of which were committed by 
MS-13 (Bruneau, 2005).  
These criminal gangs have found that they are more influential, in some instances, 
if they have some semblance of organizational structure. For example, according to 
Campo-Flores et al. (2005), some MS-13 members may be attempting to establish a 
formalized structure within the MS-13 organization. According to Oscar Bonilla, director 
of the National Council for Public Security in El Salvador, the MS-13 gang is “highly 
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organized and disciplined… with semi-clandestine structure and vertical commands” 
(Campo-Flores et al., 2005, ¶ 7). This type of structure has allowed MS-13 to act as the 
government in some parts of El Salvador and Guatemala. Bruneau (2005) states that the 
governments “have all but given up,” while the maras (gangs) collect taxes on individuals 
and businesses. However, Ribando (2008) believes that gangs lack a hierarchical 
leadership structure, are more horizontally organized with lots of subgroups, and have no 
central leadership that enforces discipline.   
Regardless of the gang’s structure, Bruneau (2005) has expressed that the maras 
could be used by political groups and hire themselves out to radical groups or terrorists. 
According to Wilson and Sullivan (2007), street gangs like MS-13 and terrorists 
organizations like al-Qaeda have some things in common. For example, they are both 
violent, use intimidation and coercion, are transnational, and thrive in areas where the 
state is weak or nonexistent. Furthermore, these newer transnational crime groups thrive 
on chaos and the ongoing regional conflicts where they operate (Shelley, 2005).  
Sullivan (2006, p. 491) believes that some gangs may evolve into third generation 
gangs that engage in political activities. For example, in 1986 a Chicago based gang 
called “El Rukn” was going to perform terrorist attacks for Libyan President Gaddafi in 
exchange for money. Fortunately, in 1987 the leader of the El Rukn gang, Jeff Fort, was 
charged with conspiring with Libya to commit domestic acts of terrorism (Five draw long 
sentences, 1987).  
The Central American region tolerates organized criminal organizations and 
criminal gangs and activities that influence politicians and government officials allowing 
them to operate their criminal enterprises in a law-free environment. The research 
literature is clear that MS-13 and M-18 are involved in human smuggling and are 
working with organized criminal organizations south of the U.S. border and in Central 
America (Kane 2006; Franco, 2008). Some U.S. Government officials have speculated 
that criminal gangs like MS-13 and M-18 will hire themselves out to smuggle terrorists 
into the U.S., while some of the scholarly research indicates that this is not a likely 
occurrence (Dangerous Desert, 2005; United States, 2005a; United States, 2005b).  
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C. TERRORISM 
There is quite a bit of scholarly literature on the topic international terrorism 
groups operating in Mexico and Central and South America. There are also a few Naval 
Postgraduate School Master’s theses that delve into these areas. Some of the key authors 
on these topics are Louise Shelley and John P. Sullivan. Both authors are routinely 
referenced in relevant scholarly literature and one would be remiss if they did not include 
their writings as part of a thorough literature review.   
Cruz (2005) does not believe that cooperation between al-Qaeda and Central 
American gangs is a likely occurrence because gangs like MS-13 are decentralized 
networks whereas al-Qaeda has a central decision making authority. Shelley and Picarelli 
(2005) argue that transnational crime groups (terrorists or international organized 
criminals) use a network structure (i.e., cells or decentralized) to reduce law enforcement 
infiltration. This type of structure also makes it challenging to determine the head of an 
organization. Furthermore, it is thought that if terrorists conceal their identity then 
criminal organizations are more likely to provide their services (Townsend & Mili, 2008). 
However, criminality by a terrorist group decreases their ability to remain anonymous 
because of their increased contact with criminal organizations (Townsend & Mili, 2008). 
For example, in Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are involved in 
both terrorism and organized crime. They are transnational in nature and finance their 
activities through organized criminal activity like drug and human smuggling (Berry et 
al., 2003).  
According to Poveda (2007, p. 25), terrorists may enter into the criminal world for 
financial reasons. Furthermore, terrorists and criminal organizations will seek out 
financial gain but may do so for different reasons. Shelley (n.d.) refers to this as 
“methods not motives” in that terrorists and criminals will engage in the same methods 
(e.g., drug trafficking, human smuggling, document fraud) to seek financial gain but will 
do so for different reasons. This is likely due to differences that exist between terrorists 
and criminal organizations in that criminals are driven by need, greed, and opportunity 
whereas terrorists are driven by ideology (O’Neil, 2007). However, it is possible that 
criminal and terrorist organizations could converge in what is described as the “gray 
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area.” This is a location where illegal activities occur and neither the terrorists nor the 
criminals take credit but each would reap the benefits from the illegal activity (Ponce, 
2006, p. 30). Furthermore, terrorists and organized criminals may work together but may 
not do so willingly. For example, organized crime groups may already control relevant 
illicit markets so the terrorists, out of necessity and not out of desire, will form temporary 
relationships with these groups to gain access to the illicit markets (Hutchinson & 
O’Malley, 2007, p. 1096).  
State corruption is another area that is common to both terrorist and criminal 
organizations. The primary purpose of state corruption is to have the freedom to conduct 
illicit operations out in the open without law enforcement or government interference 
(Shelley & Picarelli, 2005). In fact, international crime groups in China, Colombia, 
Mexico, Russia, Italy, and the United States have survived despite repressive 
governments like the Chinese communists and the former Soviet Union, and federal law 
enforcement agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Shelley, 2005). 
Sullivan and Weston (2006) discuss the impact of corruption on political and legal 
entities that eventually impact the stability of the state and its people. They go on to state 
that criminal organizations are involved in drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling, 
and extortion of which part of the proceeds go towards bribing these political and legal 
entities (Sullivan & Weston, 2006, p. 621). When left unchecked, such criminal activity 
erodes social stability and state solvency. 
D. INFORMATION SHARING 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created out of the events of 
9/11 and codified in law through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. One of the 
mandates of the new department was to consolidate 22 agencies under one umbrella so 
that the information flow between these agencies would be seamless, shared, and 
leveraged to the fullest extent possible by each agency (United States, 2009a). The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 went so far as to define the meaning of “homeland 
security information” (United States, 2002). 
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The term ‘homeland security information’ means any information 
possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that (A) relates to the threat 
of terrorist activity; (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt 
terrorist activity; (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a 
suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the 
response to a terrorist act. (p. 121) 
There are many federal agencies outside of DHS, but still within the federal 
government, that are collectors of information. For example, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Treasury Department are just a few of the 
larger collectors of information. There are also “centers” that supply information to 
consumers. For example, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) collects 
intelligence from 28 different government networks where it is then accessible by 
individual agencies (McNamara, 2006). Furthermore, there are some major information 
collectors within DHS. For example, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Coast Guard, 
Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the 
Transportation Security Administration (Nojeim, 2009). There are also numerous 
collectors of information at the state, local, and tribal levels. 
Strickland (2004) believes that it was a failure of knowledge management that 
contributed to 9/11 and Martin (2009) acknowledges that information is critical to 
preventing terrorism and crime. Furthermore, the need to share intelligence is critical 
when it comes to detecting terrorist organizations that are seemingly inconspicuous 
(Wishart, 2002). Coincidentally, Executive Order 13356 is titled “strengthening the 
sharing of terrorism information to protect Americans.” The purpose of this document is 
to give the highest priority to, among other things, the exchange of terrorism information 
among agencies and the exchange of terrorism information between agencies and state 
and local governments. The Information Systems Council, created by this Order, is 
supposed to achieve this goal (United States, 2004).    
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 called for the 
creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (United States, 2007). The goal of 
the ISE was to share terrorism information across all levels of government and the private  
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sector in order to successfully defeat terrorism (McNamara, 2006). Furthermore, the ISE 
is supposed to eliminate information gaps and ensure that the right information gets to the 
right people.  
The National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) was developed with a 
similar purpose in mind, as was Executive Order 13356, the Information Systems 
Council, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the 
Information Sharing Environment. The NSIS was developed with the understanding that 
homeland security information, terrorism information, and law enforcement information 
related to terrorism can come from all levels of government, private sector organizations, 
and foreign sources (United States, 2007). That is, all sources of information must be 
relied upon and participate in the information sharing process.  
One example of cooperation between federal agencies and foreign governments, 
even though it was prior to 9/11, involved some of the same threats that exist present day. 
The operation was called “Centaur” and involved U.S. and Argentine security agencies 
and took place in the latter part of the 1990s. Information obtained from this joint 
operation led to the breakup of a 1996 bomb plot to blowup the U.S. Embassy in 
Asuncion, which is Paraguay’s capital and resides in the TBA. A Lebanese national 
named Marwan al Safadi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and planned the 
attack. Paraguay is the home to approximately 12,000 Muslims of which a portion are 
suspected of funding or harboring Islamic terrorists. Argentina's Secretary of Security 
Enrique Mathov says that Ciudad del Este is a “breeding ground for many types of 
delinquent activity, including drug trafficking, money laundering, gun running and, 
possibly, terrorism” (de Cordoba, 2001). In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and FBI have been active in this area for years.  
John McKay does not believe that the information sharing process has been that 
successful. He believes that “the assumption that the post-9/11 era would be 
characterized by a new term—transparency—has unfortunately proven to be unfounded.” 
One example of how the federal agencies could have benefited from information sharing 
between them and a local jurisdiction is illustrated by the following traffic stop that 
occurred shortly before 9/11(United States, 2008c). 
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The Arlington, VA Police Department issued a speeding ticket to Hani 
Hanjoor, the pilot of flight #77 which attacked the Pentagon, six weeks 
prior to the 9-11 attack. The information collected by the Arlington Police, 
if automatically shared with the FBI, most probably would have alerted 
the FBI that a suspected Al-Qai’da operative was present only miles from 
our Capital and Seat of Government. Imagine the possibilities had we 
embarked upon a real commitment of law enforcement information 
sharing among all local, county, state and federal agencies (p. 5). 
While the example of 9/11 is replete with information sharing failures, the 
outlook for improvement in the information sharing environment is not as bleak as one 
may think. According to Christenson (2007), “information sharing works best when 
relationships of trust are established.” This is an important aspect that is often overlooked 
when it comes to policy and practices on information sharing. Often times, the private 
sector or local police may be alerted to something unusual or of concern or that may be of 
interest before anyone else. This is precisely why relationships between public, private, 
and nonprofit organizations are crucial for homeland security information sharing (United 
States, 2008d).  
The following example illustrates the importance of relationships in the 
information sharing process and how it can lead to the apprehension of terrorists or those 
involved in nefarious activities in support of terrorists. In September 2004, Chechen 
rebels raided a school in Beslan, Russia killing 331 people. The Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) took note of the incident and began to ask what they would do if an 
attack of this nature took place in their backyard. After some initial research, the LAPD 
detectives discovered that there were Chechen extremists in the Los Angeles area.  
Apparently a Chechen businessman in Los Angeles was affiliated with a charity 
that was reportedly sending “humanitarian” aid to Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Jordan. 
However, it was discovered that they were involved in an international car theft ring and 
were sending stolen cars overseas (Block, 2006). The LAPD informed DHS that the state 
of California had revoked the license of the Chechen businessman for failure to file a tax 
return, which resulted in Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to select 
containers belonging to this “business” for inspection. They found two sport utility 
vehicles hidden behind a false wall in the shipping container (Block, 2006). The FBI was 
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invited to look into this matter by the LAPD resulting in the seizure of 14 additional 
stolen vehicles. It is believed that the proceeds of these stolen vehicles were being used to 
support terrorism.  
State, local, and tribal agencies are critical to the prevention of future terrorist 
attacks. Furthermore, through the course of routine law enforcement activities these 
entities may gather information that points to or more importantly prevents the next 
terrorist attack (United States, 2007). However, given that the intelligence culture is 
historically secret, often times within the same agency (e.g., FBI), it is no surprise that 
information sharing is sparse between federal agencies and outside the federal 
government (Isaacson & O’Connell, 2002; Tama, 2005; Zegart, 2007).    
Information sharing requires leadership, commitment, and trust in the power of 
collaboration. Failing to share information can result in the failure to connect the dots 
(France, 2006).  
More than one agency investigating a similar case and not sharing information 
will also lead to the failure of apprehending criminal behavior prior to an incident. In 
addition, many criminal investigations can have a terrorism nexus. This makes it 
important to communicate in both directions across the organizational divisions between 
homeland security investigations and traditional criminal investigations (p. 2). 
E. SUMMARY 
Human smuggling is a recognized threat by policymakers, homeland security 
officials, as well as state and local law enforcement. Human smuggling organizations are 
a threat to National security and the stability of the Western Hemisphere. Criminal 
organizations share many of the same smuggling corridors that are used by the human 
smugglers and are, at a minimum, complicit in allowing these groups to operate their 
human smuggling rings along side their illicit narcotics operations.  
Criminal organizations have developed expertise in document fraud and human 
smuggling practices, which makes them attractive partners for terrorist organizations. 
These partnerships are likely to come to fruition in the TBA of South America as it 
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continues to be a safe haven for criminal and terrorist organizations who are engaged in 
human smuggling. The TBA is also known for attracting recruits who want to become 
part of a criminal or terrorist organization like al-Qaeda. As stated earlier, it is not 
uncommon for criminal and terrorist organizations to come into contact in the Central 
and South American region. For example, MS-13 is known to have carried out murders 
for the drug trafficking organizations, used extortion on business owners and government 
officials, as well as provided protection for criminal and human smuggling enterprises.  
The bottom line is that it is all about the money. The criminal organizations want 
to sustain a lifestyle, control territory, and turn a profit. They do not necessarily care who 
or what they are moving, as long as it does not threaten their ability to make money. Even 
then they may willingly move a known terrorist out of sympathy due to shared cultural 
similarities, ethnic background, or religious beliefs. As for the terrorists, they form these 
relationships mostly out of necessity. That is, they need access to the illicit human 
smuggling market, which includes the corridors, a variety of criminal groups, and the 
expertise on human smuggling. The risk for the terrorist groups is that by partnering with 
a criminal organization for purposes of human smuggling, they lower their ability to 
remain anonymous. However, there are examples of terrorist groups that do regularly 
engage in criminal behavior (e.g., LTTE, IRA) with no apparent desire to remain 
anonymous.   
Perhaps an equal threat, when compared to criminal and terrorist organizations, is 
corruption. The number of border agents has doubled in the past several years leading to 
tighter border security. However, this increase has also lead to an increased number of 
corruption cases. As long as the criminal and terrorist organizations have, what seems to 
be unlimited funds, and there are border agents willing to accept their bribes, corruption 
will continue to be a serious threat to the U.S.-Mexico border.     
Relationships are critical to making up information sharing shortfalls that exist 
due to ineffective legislation, policy, or systems issues. However, in the case of the FBI, 
the 9/11 report stated that the CIA had valuable information about some of the 9/11 
attackers but did not share this with the FBI because they said they needed approval from 
the Justice Department. Sadly, prior to 9/11, intelligence collection and dissemination 
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was closely guarded and frequently protected due to turf wars between federal agencies 
(National Commission, 2004). Unfortunately, even when agencies know that they can 
legally share information both within and outside the federal government there is still a 
reluctance to share. Despite these obstacles, information sharing between federal, state, 
and local entities may be one of the main ways to prevent criminal and terrorist 
organizations from working together to smuggle a terrorist into the U.S. There are a 
plethora of federal, state, and local agencies that collect and store information that is 
often times directly or indirectly related to criminal and terrorist organizations. 
Unfortunately, there is no one overarching law, executive order, national strategy or 
department that oversees the information sharing that takes place between federal, state, 
local, and tribal entities.  
The scholarly literature provides a unique look at the relationships between 
criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling, but it should not serve 
as the sole source of determining the validity of this relationship. Information obtained 
from senior homeland security and senior law enforcement professionals who have direct 
exposure to these organizations can provide further insights into how and why these 
relationships are established, as well as lend credibility to the existence of these 
relationships.    
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III. INSIGHT FROM SENIOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 
Fifteen (nine federal and six local) senior homeland security and senior law 
enforcement professionals, respectively, were interviewed between March 25, 2009 and 
April 13, 2009. They represented ten agencies along the southern land border and were 
from the following locations: San Diego, CA, Tucson, AZ, Yuma, AZ, and El Paso, TX. 
The range of time-in-service for the 15 senior officials varied from a low of 12 years to a 
high of 38 years (see Figure 1). The mean time-in-service was 23.5 years, the median was 
23 years, and the mode was 22 and 24 years resulting in a bimodal data set. The average 
number of years spent on the southwest border was 17.1 years. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Number of Years in Service 
This research captured a representative sample of views and professional 
experience from senior law enforcement and homeland security officials at the federal, 
county, and local level who represent different segments of the southwest border. 
Furthermore, they were able to provide knowledge about homeland security in terms of 
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criminal and terrorist organizations, as well as human smuggling. The data was collected 
during a recorded 60 minute telephone interview with each official, whereby they were 
asked approximately 13 questions. The responses to these questions were used to codify 
the relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human 
smuggling, which may ultimately threaten the southwest border of the United States. 
A qualitative analysis was conducted for each of the 15 interviews. This detailed 
review and analysis of each recorded telephone interview highlighted the various themes 
that emerged in terms of their similarities and differences. The interviews revealed the 
following seven themes: method of entry into the U.S., reasons for forming a partnership, 
benefits of entering into a relationship, type of relationship needed to penetrate the U.S., 
type of group(s) that would work with a terrorist organization, factors that inhibit a 
relationship from occurring, and factors that allow relationships to occur.  
When discussing the theme “method of entry into the U.S.,” the senior officials 
revealed nine separate ways that a terrorist could enter the U.S. undetected. While all 
seven of the above mentioned themes will be addressed in the discussion on interview 
data, the theme “method of entry into the U.S.” will be discussed under its own heading, 
since this helps establish the basis of this thesis, which is the possible formation of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling.  
A. METHOD OF ENTRY TO THE U.S. 
Despite various levels of direct experience with human smuggling among senior 
law enforcement and senior homeland security officials, as a group they were able to 
identify nine different ways that would most likely be used by a terrorist to gain 
undetected entry into the U.S. (see Figure 2). The two most frequently mentioned 
methods were entering the U.S. surreptitiously through the use of drug trafficking or 




Figure 2.   Method of Entry to U.S. 
1. Illegal Entry  
When it comes to entering the U.S. illegally, the most common method would be 
to leverage the established smuggling routes. The criminal organizations (drug 
trafficking) control the smuggling routes and allow the human smuggling groups to use 
these routes for a fee.  
There are some people that will smuggle anyone if the price is right and it 
has occurred from second and third hand accounts but we do not know 
who they are or how to locate them based on limited information. 
(Interview with senior homeland security official, March 26, 2009)  
A lot of the human smuggling groups will only smuggle their own kind (e.g., 
Chinese smuggling Chinese or Korean smuggling Korean) (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, April 7, 2009). This is born out in the case of Salim 
Boughader Mucharrafille, a well known smuggler who is of Lebanese-Mexican origin. 
He smuggled about 200 Lebanese Hezbollah sympathizers into the United States prior to 
his arrest in December 2002. “It takes money to move high value people and the terrorist 
organizations are very well funded. They can just say, here is the money and get me 
through to wherever” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 31, 2009). 
So, illegal entry, regardless of who is performing the smuggling, is a threat to the security 
of the U.S.  
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2. Legal Entry 
A logical question is how could a terrorist enter the U.S. legally? The answer is 
that the person making entry would not have any associated criminal or derogatory 
information when their name and documents are run through law enforcement databases. 
That is, they would have a clean criminal record. So, it would appear that there is no need 
for an association between a criminal and a terrorist organization in terms of human 
smuggling when utilizing this method of entry. However, as will be illustrated by the 
interview data, these individuals that enter with clean documents are often times 
supported by terrorist organizations who engage in criminal activity as a source of 
revenue with the sole purpose of attacking the U.S. For example, the below quote 
illustrates how entering the U.S. legally is not only supported by terrorists who engage in 
criminal activity, but how devastating the consequences can be using this method of 
entry. 
Entering as a foreign student is a great way to get into this country as a 
person with a clean record. As we know from September 11, we know that 
the 19 hijackers came into this country legally. The main concern is the 
people that do not have records that are not on our radar, that would come 
into the country legally and do us harm. (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 3, 2009) 
We know from “The 9/11 Commission Report” that the 19 hijackers were funded 
by al-Qaeda. We also know that al-Qaeda frequently engages in various criminal 
activities as a means of generating revenue to support terrorist activities. While there is 
not an immediate and observable link between criminal and terrorist organizations in 
terms of human smuggling and persons making legal entry, there is a link that exists, as 
described above in the case of 9/11, but it may not be discovered until the occurrence of 
another 9/11 type event.  
The use of fraudulent documents and entry by small boat were the third and fourth 




3. Fraudulent Documents 
Establishing a fake identity was thought to be pretty simple, especially if the 
person could get to “Central America where they could get whatever fraudulent 
documentation they need” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 10, 
2009). Central America is in close proximity to South America, which may be another 
spot to get fraudulent documents according to the following statement. “The hottest place 
to get documents is Venezuela. Up until a person is fingerprinted in the U.S., they can 
actually pick their name; make up whatever identity they want” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 27, 2009). This is why the current biometric systems 
(e.g., US-VISIT and NSEERS) used to capture fingerprints and photos (for non U.S. 
citizens) upon entry into the U.S. are so crucial for determining a person’s true identity.  
4. Small Boat  
There is some evidence of people trying to enter the country illegally by way of 
small boat. According to one senior law enforcement official, “they occasionally recover 
small boats on the beach that are used to smuggle marijuana or people up north. Every 
few weeks Coast Guard and Border Patrol will find an abandoned boat on the beach with 
a little outboard motor” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009). 
According to a senior homeland security official, the coast is so long and vulnerable that 
it is one of the preferred methods (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
March 27, 2009). The U.S. shoreline near the Mexican border presents another 
opportunity for criminal and terrorist organizations to penetrate U.S. security.   
Having a Hispanic appearance and use of the asylum process were the fifth and 
sixth most frequently mentioned methods of how a terrorist may gain undetected entry 
into the U.S. Both avenues have equally devastating consequences.  
5. Hispanic Appearance  
Two senior officials mentioned the striking resemblance that exists between a 
person of Middle Eastern descent and a person of Mexican descent (Interview with senior 
law enforcement official, March 27, 2009; Interview with senior homeland security 
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official, March 30, 2009). If one were to put them in standard clothes instead of 
traditional clothes, and place them side by side without speaking, it would be pretty hard 
to tell them apart according to these officials. Furthermore, if a terrorist was Hispanic, or 
more importantly could pass themselves off as Hispanic, they could “sneak in with a 
group between the ports of entry in El Paso” (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, March 30, 2009). Lastly, using this same modus operandi they could “blend in 
with the migrant workers moving north” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, 
April 1, 2009).  
6. Asylum  
The asylum process is very similar to the legal entry process discussed earlier. 
That is, there is no immediate and observable link between criminal and terrorist 
organizations in terms of human smuggling and the person seeking asylum (or the person 
seeking legal entry). These asylum seekers are frequently affiliated with groups like al-
Qaeda who want to get people into the U.S. who have no “obvious” association to 
terrorism, criminal activity, or human smuggling.  
During the asylum1 process, you get fingerprinted and interviewed, “but if there is 
no derogatory information, you are considered to be clean” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, April 1, 2009). The person seeking asylum does not have to 
present identification documents, “all they have to present is a story” (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, March 27, 2009). The Somali’s are one example of a 
group that is using the asylum process as a legalized way of getting smuggled in the open 
into the U.S. Here is what two senior officials had to say about the asylum process. 
Word of mouth gets passed around quickly so they know what story is 
going to work; for instance I am from such and such Klan, from this area 
in Somalia, I have been persecuted, my family members have been raped 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Asylum Program provides protection to qualified applicants who are already in the U. S. or 
are seeking entry into the U. S. at a port of entry. Asylum-seekers may apply for asylum in the U.S. 
regardless of their countries of origin and regardless of their current immigration status. There are no 





and murdered, and if I go back I will be persecuted so I need asylum. This 
is their story, they give you a name and that is all you have; they go to 
court and if we have no evidence against them they are out the door. The 
vast majority of the people seen in San Diego seeking asylum are either 
Iraqis claiming to be Christian Chaldeans or Somali’s. (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, March 27, 2009) 
The Somalis’ seeking asylum is just as much of a threat as the DTO’s 
(drug trafficking organizations) smuggling someone into the U.S. There 
are a large number of Somali’s that cross; they show-up at the border with 
no identification, and just the clothes on their back seeking asylum. More 
often than not that asylum is granted. God knows where they go; that is a 
huge threat. One of the biggest al- Qaeda related threats in the U.S. right 
now are within the Somali population. Al- Qaeda has been able to make 
great inroads in the horn of Africa with the Al- Shabab terrorist 
organization. The route that the Somalis’ take to get to the U.S. is rather 
circuitous. They generally work their way from Africa, across the Atlantic, 
into Central America, up into Mexico and then they will cross at the San 
Ysidro, CA port of entry. (Interview with senior law enforcement official, 
March 30, 2009) 
While the asylum process may be a viable way to gain access to the U.S., one 
senior homeland security official believes that a lot of the suspect parties are those people 
who already have U.S. citizenship (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
April 1, 2009). This is supported by the July 27, 2009 arrest of six U.S. citizens and one 
legal permanent resident, all living in North Carolina. They were all charged with 
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, 
maim and injure persons’ abroad (United States, 2009b). 
If a person has a derogatory history, they would likely avoid the asylum process 
for fear of detection when their name and fingerprints are run through law enforcement 
databases. One of their options, besides asylum, would be to take advantage of a weak 
border official who could be corrupted. 
7. Corruption 
Corruption is not only potentially devastating to the security of the U.S., but it has 
damaging effects on the image and perception of law abiding border officials. None of 
the senior officials believe that a border official would intentionally allow a terrorist into 
the country. However, “once the official has gone corrupt, they are not in control of what 
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is really inside of a vehicle or cargo container that they allow to enter the U.S. without 
inspection” (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 7, 2009).  
The remaining two of the nine ways identified by senior officials that a terrorist 
could gain undetected entry into the U.S. were by air and land.  
8. Small Airplane 
There is evidence of drug smugglers using a new tool to avoid radar, ultralight 
aircraft (a one-person motorized aircraft that resembles a hang glider), to bring drugs 
across the border (Bazar, 2009). These ultralight aircraft have carried up to 350 pounds of 
marijuana and could be used by one or more of the following (criminal, terrorist, or 
human smuggling organization) either separately or cooperatively to carry a pilot and one 
operative into the U.S.    
9. Tunnels 
There are storm drains that are very similar to tunnels located in one large 
southwest Texas city that have “maps inside of them in Spanish telling the illegal where 
they are at and where they will come out at” (Interview with senior law enforcement 
official, March 27, 2009). Apparently the city hall of this particular city is built right on 
top of this storm drain, so if someone wanted to, they could easily do damage to city hall. 
“Unfortunately this storm drain cannot be blocked because the water has to drain” 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 27, 2009).  
Now that I have discussed the nine ways a terrorist could enter the country 
undetected, I will turn to the four elements of this thesis that address the central question 
of whether or not a relationship exists between criminal and terrorist organizations in 
terms of human smuggling. Those four elements are human smuggling, criminal 
organizations, terrorist organizations, and information sharing.   
B. HUMAN SMUGGLING 
The information obtained from the interviews relative to each persons experience 
with human smuggling varied between senior law enforcement officials and senior 
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homeland security officials. The senior law enforcement officials that were interviewed 
did not have a lot of activity within their area of responsibility that pertains to human 
smuggling despite their close proximity to the southern land border. They are aware that 
there are stash houses being used for housing illegal aliens waiting to be transported 
further into the interior of the U.S. within their communities but in many cases they have 
no authority to enforce immigration laws. They are constrained by current laws and have 
stated that, “we cannot legally ask them for their citizenship,” referring to “possible 
illegal aliens” that they encounter (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 
31, 2009). One senior law enforcement official admitted that “there are very strong 
human rights groups” that places even more pressure on the local police and sheriffs to 
avoid immigration related matters (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 
31, 2009). When it comes to asking someone for their immigration status in El Paso, 
Texas the response from law enforcement is, “this is a very hot topic” (Interview with 
senior law enforcement official, March 31, 2009). 
Despite not having much direct interaction with human smuggling, the senior law 
enforcement officials “are convinced that there are bodies and drugs coming through the 
tunnels” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 3, 2009). Human 
smuggling tunnels vary in their level of sophistication. Some are crudely dug and are just 
large enough to squeeze through, whereas others are professionally trenched with support 
beams, electricity, and have fans blowing air through them. Something that does not 
receive as much notoriety, but is just as important, is the human smuggling infrastructure 
beyond the tunnels, which was described as “sophisticated” and likened to an “airport 
terminal.”   
When you go to Southwest Airlines and you say I want to fly to a certain 
location; and they say from El Paso you will have a connecting flight into 
Houston and then you go to National and you finally wind up in Chicago. 
Well that is how sophisticated these guys are (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, March 31, 2009). 
The senior homeland security officials have much more exposure to human 
smuggling than do the senior law enforcement officials. This is primarily due to the fact 
that as part of their mission they are charged with enforcing federal immigration and 
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narcotics laws. Despite their differences in level of exposure to human smuggling there 
was a consensus among senior officials that human smuggling organizations and drug 
trafficking organizations operate in a similar manner. 
The similarities lie in the fact that they both have to rely on an established 
infrastructure and trusted network to move their illicit goods. However, the human 
smugglers are considered to be a lower tier when compared to the drug trafficking 
organizations and have to pay the drug trafficking organizations for use of some of the 
corridors. According to one senior homeland security official, it may be advantageous to 
be on the lower tier. 
Because human smuggling is such a lucrative business, and because the 
time spent in jail for human smuggling is much less when compared to 
drug smuggling, a lot of the drug trafficking organizations and individual 
couriers and movers had switched over to alien smuggling because it was 
easier and the penalties were less. (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, March 25, 2009) 
Because they are on the lower tier, the human smuggling organizations will take 
direction on when and how they move their loads, so as to not interfere with a narcotics 
load. “The value of a drug shipment is significantly higher than a human smuggling load. 
The drug trafficking organizations will not risk mixing the two for fear of losing their 
high value shipment to a lower profit human smuggling scheme” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 25, 2009).  
While both human smuggling and drug trafficking organizations have an 
institutional structure, the drug trafficking organizations are much more centralized and 
“have bosses, lieutenants, and subordinates” (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, April 1, 2009). However, the human smuggling organizations are “more of a 
loose confederation of lots of groups of people that are almost like subcontractors on a 
large construction project” (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 1, 
2009). For example, “one group may not have enough vans so they call someone else 
who may have the space in their vans” (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
April 1, 2009). Despite this loose confederation, there is a significant amount of  
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coordination that is taking place between human smuggling groups. One senior homeland 
security official explained why there is such a demand and need for coordination between 
human smugglers.  
In order to get a person from Mexico into the U.S. there has to be people 
involved that know the terrain on both sides of the border as well as into 
the interior of the U.S. There are a lot of remote areas (along the border) 
that if you do not know where you are going, you would get lost; or in the 
winter time you would die – as well as in the summer; from either the cold 
or the heat. (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 30, 
2009)  
Unfortunately, the risk is that a human smuggling organization is going to bring in 
someone from a country who is affiliated with some terrorist organization, and they will 
not even know it. Another risk that seemingly gives the appearance that there is no 
criminal or terrorist involvement is what I call legalized human smuggling, otherwise 
known as asylum.  
The asylum process is another way for terrorists to enter the country (e.g., 
Somalis’ showing up at U.S. land border ports of entry seeking asylum) and on the 
surface it does not appear that they are connected to the criminal, terrorist, or human 
smuggling organizations (i.e., there will be no paper trail or electronic history linking the 
person seeking asylum to any criminal entity). However, as discussed earlier, the terrorist 
organizations are frequently funding these people seeking asylum as a way of legalized 
human smuggling and facilitating their travel to the U.S. land border ports of entry. One 
homeland security official summed up the threat of asylum this way.  
Somewhere around 85% of the Somalis’ that arrive in the U.S. arrive in 
San Diego. There is a very well organized smuggling organization route 
from Africa, either through one of the gulf states on the Arabian peninsula 
or through South Africa, then through South America, then through 
Central America, then through Mexico, up to Tijuana and they show up on 
our door step at San Ysidro saying here I am and I need asylum. 
Sometimes they show up in the dozens. Are these people truly seeking 
asylum to be protected or is mixed in amongst them someone who is 
actually assisting al-Qaeda? So right now I think the bigger threat is the 
people claiming asylum. (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
April 7, 2009) 
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There is one more avenue of human smuggling, similar to the asylum process, 
which seemingly requires no surreptitious behavior and is just as much of a threat to the 
security of the U.S. This one avenue involves the assistance of border agents who work in 
cooperation with criminal and potentially terrorist organizations to allow people or things 
into the U.S. without inspection. This corrupt behavior was determined to be problematic 
by all 15 senior officials. Furthermore, they stated that drug trafficking organizations are 
able to influence officers either directly or indirectly.  
The reasons for corruption vary and do not fall neatly into one category. While it 
was unanimous that it is an infrequent occurrence, it was also unanimous that when it 
does occur it can have devastating effects on homeland security. However, it was 
mentioned during several interviews that, “if they (the corrupt officer) knew it was a 
terrorist they were letting in, they (the officer) would not do it” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 25, 2009; Interview with senior homeland security 
official, April 1, 2009).  
There are a variety of ways that corrupt officers are caught, but it is not 
uncommon for fellow officers to be the ones that notice something is not quite right and 
report the suspect individual(s). Nearly half (47 percent or 7 out of 15) of all senior 
officials interviewed mentioned that “money and greed” were the primary reasons for 
falling to corruption (see Figure 3). One senior homeland security official said “the 
money is phenomenal” (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 26, 
2009). 
Twenty-percent of senior officials (3 out of 15) identified “family ties” or “family 
relationships” as the reason for succumbing to corruption (see Figure 3). Some officers 
have family on both sides of the border (i.e., in Mexico and the U.S.), which was 
identified as a factor leading to corruption. One senior law enforcement official said “we 
do what we are supposed to when we hire people, but blood is thicker than water” 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009). This statement indicates 
that familial loyalty supersedes the officer’s loyalty and commitment to protecting the 
U.S. and its borders.    
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According to one senior law enforcement official, another factor leading to 
corruption is sex (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009) (see 
Figure 3). The senior official did not elaborate on this particular act of corruption, but 
anecdotally this occurs when a woman (often times an illegal alien) befriends an officer 
who works on the border and they engage in a sexual relationship. The woman will then 
ask or demand that the Officer allow someone (usually a family member who is also an 
illegal alien) to pass through the port without inspection (i.e., turning a blind-eye). Once 
the Officer does this, they are basically indebted to the woman whom they are having the 
sexual relationship with until they get caught or turn themselves in to the authorities.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Reason for Corruption 
In all of these corruption cases, whether it is for money, family reasons, or sex, 
“once they (the officer) get paid, they got them (the officer)” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 26, 2009). In the case of the drug trafficking 
organizations, they will lie to the officers and tell them they want to “move a trunk load 
of marijuana and here is your five grand. The drug trafficking organizations know the 
officer cannot pop the trunk and they move coke (cocaine) instead of marijuana” 
(Interview with senior homeland security official, March 26, 2009). 
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The drug trafficking organizations and human smuggling networks are becoming 
more and more sophisticated and creative on the way they get their products into the U.S. 
One senior homeland security official stated that “there are people who have joined the 
border patrol in order to smuggle. There are likely young kids being groomed to join the 
border patrol to wave that one car through” (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, March 30, 2009). Another senior homeland security official stated “we know 
DTO’s (drug trafficking organizations) are specifically recruiting young men and women 
who have no criminal history that are fairly intelligent that can get through our vetting 
process and then come to work for us” (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
March 25, 2009). This is an enormous vulnerability and one that could have devastating 
consequences. This is effectively a 100 percent guarantee that the smuggled item (e.g., 
terrorist, drugs, weapons, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosives 
material) will make it past the border and into the U.S.   
The impact of corruption is known in some instances and in others we may never 
really know the full impact until it is too late. One thing is true, and it has been echoed by 
the senior officials who were interviewed for this thesis, and that is the corrupt officer 
does not know what they are allowing into the country (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, April 7, 2009; Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 10, 
2009). As far as allowing carloads of illegal immigrants to pass through the border, one 
senior law enforcement official had this to say. 
So out of those thousands could some of them have been Iranian, 
Pakistani; members of a terrorist organization; yes they could have but we 
will never know until one of the terrorists get caught and they tell us they 
came through the port. (Interview with senior law enforcement official, 
April 10, 2009) 
Despite the fact that the corrupt official never really knows what or who they are 
allowing into the country (because they do not look), they are brazen enough to think that 
they can determine and dictate to the drug trafficking organizations or human smuggling 
networks what they will and will not do.  
A recent corruption case where the officer told his handlers you can bring 
me Mexicans and Central Americans but do not bring me any Muslims or 
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terrorists. He (the corrupt officer) thought he could tell them who they 
were going to do business with and call the shots and control who they 
brought in. (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 7, 
2009) 
The senior homeland security official went on to state what many in law 
enforcement already know, and that is once you go corrupt, “you are not in control, you 
work for them, you are not working for the U.S. Government anymore; the bad guys call 
the shots” (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 7, 2009). 
C. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 
For the purposes of this research, criminal organizations can be defined in one of 
three ways: 1) drug trafficking organizations or cartels, 2) criminal gangs like MS-13 or 
M-18, and 3) human smuggling organizations. Each senior official was asked to describe 
their experience with both criminal and terrorist organizations and it was not uncommon 
that terrorist organizations were also considered to be criminal organizations. Despite the 
fact that criminality is common among both criminal and terrorist organizations they will 
be discussed separately so the similarities as well as the differences are highlighted.  
All of the senior officials have experience dealing with criminal organizations 
who deal in drugs and human smuggling. These organizations can be large sophisticated 
drug cartels, international criminal gangs like MS-13 or M-18, or small family run 
operations. Often times, these organizations are all interconnected and work together in 
both the U.S. and Mexico. “The people that smuggle narcotics are the same people, or are 
associated with, those that smuggle aliens” (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, March 30, 2009). As described earlier under the section on human smuggling, 
the routes used to smuggle narcotics are the same routes used to smuggle people. 
Therefore, there is, at a minimum, some level of coordination between these two 
smuggling entities in order to move their illicit but very different commodities.  
These criminal organizations are all in business to make money. Generally 
speaking, they will not take on a risky venture if it will jeopardize their business, but they 
will allow others to perform their more risky business ventures. For example, the criminal 
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gangs that work for the drug cartels (who are also criminal organizations), are considered 
to be subcontractors (i.e., they do the dirty work).  
Most subcontractors will move anything for the right price. If you are a 
human smuggler you are going to have the ability and the infrastructure 
established in Mexico to keep that person hidden. This is why al-Qaeda, 
on its own, could not smuggle terrorists or weapons of mass destruction 
into this country alone. They are going to have to rely on local talents 
especially if they are looking at our (U.S. southern land border) more 
remote areas. (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 30, 
2009) 
It is well known that organized criminal gangs are working with the drug 
trafficking organizations. “In order to secure those routes into the U.S. and to keep those 
lines going, they (drug trafficking organizations) are employing gangs to do it” 
(Interview with senior homeland security official, March 25, 2009). The drug trafficking 
organizations are very deliberate about getting the gangs to work for them. “They (gangs) 
are already in the community, they (gangs) already have their lookouts, and they (gangs) 
already have their infrastructure where they can move a bunch of stuff clandestinely” 
(Interview with senior homeland security official, March 25, 2009). The drug trafficking 
organizations look for the gangs because there is an endless supply of them.  
The motivation for the gangs to work with the criminal organizations is 
constant money and a good assurance that they are going to get paid for 
what they do and that there is going to be an ongoing business 
relationship. (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 25, 
2009) 
In order to keep the illicit goods flowing from Mexico into the U.S., there has to 
be secure supply routes. The criminal organizations (drug trafficking) in Mexico control 
the routes (corridors) and what comes through them. “They are structured enough to have 
management and people that run the corridors. Nobody comes through the corridors 
without paying them a bribe” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 10, 
2009). In fact, one senior law enforcement official stated that “there are people that we 
know operate in Mexico that are untouchable because they have been operating for so 
long” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009). 
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These criminal organizations work in much the same way as a franchise. 
There can be smaller cells that are quasi independent from the larger cartel 
but pay tribute to that cartel for the ability or the right to move product 
into and out of the U.S. Thus if you go outside the rules of the franchise 
you either pay some penalty or you lose the right to continue your 
business or your family is hurt in some way as a reminder that you need to 
stay in line with the rules. (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, April 7, 2009) 
On the U.S. side, it is believed that the cartels are recruiting gang members to 
collect their debts. For example, in March 2009 a Hispanic couple (boyfriend and 
girlfriend) was car jacked in broad daylight. “The boyfriend was dealing in narcotics and 
dropped a load (i.e., lost it, got ripped off, or it was taken at the border) resulting in him 
owing the cartels some money” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 
2009). 
In San Diego, right on the border, the local street gangs are largely controlled by 
the Mexican Mafia also known as La Eme. “Unquestionably the Mexican Mafia has a 
very strong relationship and probably some aspects of it are controlled by the various 
drug cartels south of the border” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 
30, 2009). 
Another gang known as the Barrio Azteca is located in El Paso and will “switch 
sides and go from one side to the other” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, 
March 31, 2009). That is, they will work for whatever criminal organization gives them 
the better bang-for-the-buck. “The Azteca’s are a business oriented organization that just 
happens to be very violent. There main thing, of course like any other business, is making 
money” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 31, 2009). 
D. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
It was not entirely surprising that the majority of the senior officials did not have 
any experience with terrorist organizations given that they interpreted “experience” as 
direct contact or exposure to a terrorist or terrorist organization. The general response 
was that “we do not deal with this too much” or “I have not dealt with any terrorists to 
my direct knowledge” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009; 
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Interview with senior homeland security official, April 1, 2009). When someone did 
come across a person that they suspected may be a terrorist, they called the FBI or JTTF. 
Unfortunately, one senior official said that when he called the FBI, he did not receive any 
feedback, so he had no idea if the person may have been a terrorist (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 30, 2009). Because the senior homeland security and 
senior law enforcement officials did not have much experience with terrorism directly, 
this section will focus on the existing information related to terrorist links to organized 
crime and human smuggling.  
Western Hemisphere countries present a variety of conditions that favor 
transnational crime and terrorist activity (Berry et al., 2003). In particular, Mexico, 
Central America, and the Tri Border Area (TBA) of South America present similar 
problems for U.S. security. However, the U.S itself is also ripe for transnational crime 
and terrorist activity. The criminal and terrorist organizations in these parts of the 
Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., are known for their activities associated with 
drug smuggling, human smuggling, money laundering, and fund raising activities in 
support of terrorism.  
Mexico serves as a safe haven for transnational criminal and terrorist groups 
because of its geographic proximity to the U.S., fluid cross-border movement of people, 
goods, and cash, an existing criminal infrastructure, and an environment of corruption 
among Mexican institutions (Berry et al., 2003). For example, there are alien smuggling 
and document forgery rings in Mexico that are linked to MS-13 and M-18. There are also 
Russian criminal organizations engaged in a wide array of illegal activities in Mexico, 
which include drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and alien smuggling (Miro 
& Curtis, 2003). Additionally, Asian criminal organizations are active in Mexico and 
have partnered with the domestic alien smuggling and human trafficking rings. 
Furthermore, there are alien smuggling rings that specialize in smuggling Middle Eastern 
nationals into the U.S. (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). 
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A Mexican immigration official stated in January 2002 that there are people 
linked to terrorism in Mexico. He went on to identify Hezbollah and made reference to 
others that have links to Osama Bin Laden (Miro & Curtis, 2003). He further expounded 
that there are six or seven organizations with links to terrorist groups, but the six or seven 
are not engaged in terrorist activities. Mexico’s immigration service denies the statements 
made by the immigration official.  
According to Berry et al., (2003), the larger and more sophisticated drug 
trafficking groups in Mexico are less likely to knowingly cooperate with terrorist groups 
because of the risk to their narcotics empire. However, some of the smaller, less 
established criminal organizations may be more willing to engage in a relationship with 
terrorist organizations.   
Central and South America are popular transit points because of their proximity to 
the U.S. and the ease with which migrants from other countries with terrorist ties can, 
legally or through bribery, obtain tourist visas (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). 
According to the March 2009 report titled Operation Cazando Anguilas or “hunting eels” 
(outsourced by the Department of Defense to a Latin American security consulting 
company), there is an alliance between terrorist organizations in Latin America, Mexican 
drug cartels, and “Muslim businessmen.” Apparently, the Muslim businessmen are 
providing the drug cartels and terrorist organizations with money laundering services. 
Furthermore, the Muslim businessmen, drug cartels, and Central American gangs (i.e., 
MS-13 and M-18) are collaborating to smuggle Persons of Interest of Islamic Origin 
(PIIO) from terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah into the U.S. (Kimery, 
2009). The drug cartels and gangs are acting as the “street enforcers” for these operations 
and MS-13 and M-18 are providing the “transportation security.” The PIIO’s are 
“Muslims who are arriving in Panama and Central America via Venezuela and 
Colombia.” The report describes them as “shooters” and “managers of some terrorist 
element.” 
Operation Cazando Anguilas reveals that approximately two years ago a peace 
treaty was “negotiated” between the gangs by “Muslim businessmen” in order to increase 
the “success of currency, drug, and human smuggling operations managed by these 
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Muslim Kingpins” (Kimery, 2009). This alliance provides radical Islamic supporters with 
access to MS-13 and M-18’s expansive and fully capable network throughout Central 
America, Mexico, and the U.S. According to Johnson and Muhlhausen (2005) and 
National Gang Intelligence Center (2009) MS-13 are experts at gaining illegal entry into 
the U.S. and will cross the U.S.-Mexico border with this as their sole intent. 
In order to assist PIIO smuggling, special schools have been set up by the Muslim 
businessmen to train the PIIO’s to speak Spanish and learn the Hispanic culture. 
Conversely, the gang members who escort the PIIO’s are taught Arabic and indoctrinated 
into Islamic fundamentalism (Kimery, 2009). Furthermore, Homeland Security Today 
obtained classified intelligence that some gang members are receiving Arabic and 
military training from Hezbollah at farms in Honduras that are owned by wealthy Muslim 
businessmen.  
Further South is the TBA, which consists of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and 
serves as another shelter for organized crime and terrorist groups. The social structure in 
communities around the TBA like Ciudad del Este are ideal for Arabic-speaking terrorist 
groups. Approximately 90 percent of the Arab population in Ciudad del Este is of 
Lebanese origin. As a result, “extremists find the opportunity to assemble, form a cell 
with no risks of leaks, carry out their missions, and return with alibis backed up by many 
in the community” (Berry et al., 2003). According to Berry et al., (2003), in October 
2001, Commandant Hugo Miranda, commander of Argentina’s National Border Guard 
stated that “conditions in the TBA favor the area’s role as a hotbed of terrorist cells 
known as sleeper cells.” He further elaborated stating that “people in this community 
have ties to fanatical religious groups, and they are in contact with the Middle Eastern 
countries.” 
Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are known to have used the TBA for fund raising, 
money laundering, and drug trafficking and many worry that al-Qaeda may be using the 
same network as that of Hezbollah to raise funds (Zambelis, 2005). According to Carter 
(2009), Hezbollah has also had a long presence in the TBA, whereby they are engaged in 
narcotics and human trafficking. Incidents of radical Islamist activity have been linked to 
Hezbollah in the TBA and are known to be ideologically and politically close to Iran 
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(United States, 2006). Iran, by the way, provides $100 million dollars a year to Hezbollah 
according to a Treasury Department official (Vardi, 2006). 
When it comes to smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border, there seems to be an 
increasing reliance on the Mexican drug cartels that control the smuggling routes. In fact, 
Hezbollah relies on "the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and 
transportation experts as the drug cartels” according to Michael Braun, retired Assistant 
Administrator, Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (Carter, 
2009). According to Franco (2008), policy makers are concerned about human and 
narcotics smuggling rings being used by terrorists to enter the U.S. undetected. Perhaps 
policy makers should be concerned given that terrorists frequently engage in criminal 
activity like drug trafficking and human smuggling to finance their operations (Mincheva 
& Gurr, 2006). According to Shelley and Picarelli (2005), drug trafficking is the main 
source of income for organized criminal organizations and terrorists. The bottom line is 
that terrorist groups require funding to maintain their operations (Hutchinson & 
O'Malley, 2007).  
According to Keefer (2006), drug trafficking and terrorism are linked in that 
terrorists use the transportation networks of drug smugglers and human smugglers to 
move their operatives. Thus, it is conceivable that as the U.S. continues to increase 
security that terrorists and human smugglers may become partners (Ordonez, 2008). In 
fact, it is not only possible, it has already occurred. For example, Mahmoud Youssef 
Kourani was able to travel to Mexico from Lebanon through what is known as the 
“Lebanon-Tijuana” pipeline. He bribed a Mexican consulate official in Beirut by paying 
$3,000 to get a Mexican visa (Arrillaga & Rodriguez, 2005). This allowed him to travel 
from Lebanon to Mexico where he was able to connect with a human smuggling 
operation. Both Kourani and one other man were smuggled across the southwest border 
on February 4, 2001 in the trunk of a car. While in the U.S., Kourani was reportedly 
involved in some fund raising for Hezbollah and sent them around $40,000 during his 




engaged in criminal activity while in the U.S. in support of Hezbollah. It is clear from 
Kourani’s past that he was engaging in criminal activity while in the U.S. in support of 
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization.  
A second example involves Salim Boughader Mucharrafille who is of Lebanese-
Mexican origin and is also a well-known human smuggler. Boughader, just like Kourani, 
was also leveraging the “Lebanon-Tijuana” human smuggling pipeline. His formal 
occupation was that of a café owner in Tijuana, but he was also involved in the nefarious 
movement of Lebanese migrants into the U.S. This would not be an uncommon venture 
for terrorists who, according to O’Neil (2007), will engage in legal and illegal means to 
satisfy the need of human smuggling. It would seem that Boughader fits into this 
category.   
Boughader’s clientele reportedly told U.S. and Mexican officials that they paid 
several thousand dollars for fraudulent visas from the consulate office in Beirut, so they 
could make their way from Lebanon to Mexico and eventually into the U.S. (this is the 
same modus operandi used by Kourani). In fact, one of Boughader’s clients worked for a 
Hezbollah-owned television network that glorified suicide bombers (United States, 
2006a).  
Up until December 2002, when Boughader was arrested, he had smuggled about 
200 Lebanese, to include Hezbollah sympathizers, into the United States (Arrillaga & 
Rodriguez, 2005). According to Boughader, even if the officers at the border do stop you, 
the document checks being done at the border are poor (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005).  
While Boughader was a smuggler who facilitated the movement of Lebanese 
migrants and Kourani was smuggled, the methods used by both were very much the 
same. That is, they engaged in criminal activity (bribing government officials) to get to 
Mexico and worked with human smugglers (criminal organizations) to illegally enter the 
U.S. at which time they engaged in fund raising to support Hezbollah (a terrorist 
organization).   
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E. INFORMATION SHARING 
One of the most frequently mentioned current or future factors in preventing the 
formation of a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of 
human smuggling was strong communication and information (intelligence) sharing  
between federal, state, and local agencies and between units within an agency (e.g., 
homicide, robbery, gangs, and intelligence). “There has to be overlap between terrorism 
and human smuggling and we have to make those connections by bringing the people 
(law enforcement) together who are working in these areas” (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 1, 2009).  
There were four key areas related to information sharing that will be highlighted 
and discussed in detail. The act of information sharing, if improved upon, will have an 
immediate and substantive impact on the ability of homeland security experts to provide 
a collaborative, fully engaged, and knowledgeable work force with the capabilities of 
identifying and defeating criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human 
smuggling. 
1. Relationships 
There was an overwhelming consensus that all of the federal, state, and local 
agencies work very well together. The level of communication and cooperation was seen 
by the majority of the senior officials as the best they have ever experienced. In fact, most 
of the agency heads communicate with one another on a first-name basis. Many of these 
successful relationships are based on the personnel that get selected. That is, you must 
pick people that are really good at what they do, but who can also work in an 
environment with someone who may view things differently. Furthermore, the 
information sharing works very well once the relationships are established. For example, 
if you know someone at another agency, and you have developed a level of trust, “you 
can get ten times more done than if you do not know anyone” (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, April 1, 2009). 
One other factor that fostered close-working relationships was geography. In El 
Paso, Texas, the law enforcement community is so far away from the next major city 
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(approximately 4 hours) that they have to rely on one another out of necessity. It is out of 
this necessity that has grown a relationship of respect. “It is like a family, you have spats, 
but you work it out. All of the agencies know they need each other to survive” (Interview 
with senior law enforcement official, March 27, 2009). But the mere presence of a 
positive working relationship, both at the leadership and working level, does not 
necessarily mean that information sharing is occurring on a consistent basis (this point 
will be discussed in more detail).  
2. Task Force and Working Groups  
The majority of the agencies participate in some type of task force or working 
group, which enhances the information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies. 
Many of the agencies are part of their local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), fusion 
center, or High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) group. Additionally, there are 
numerous working groups comprised of federal, state, and local agencies (including 
Army intelligence in one case), that were formed to meet local or regional demands 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009).  
One of the many advantages of attending regular meetings and working together 
on task forces is that it creates information sharing efficiencies and fosters personal 
relationships. For example, one local law enforcement agency accommodates federal law 
enforcement personnel within their facility, which allows for on-the-spot screening of 
immigration related violations (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 3, 
2009). 
One senior homeland security official mentioned that the long-term relationships 
developed through the task forces and working groups may have a down-side. For 
example, there was an officer assigned to a local task force for three years who was 
promoted and subsequently “pulled off” the task force. This unforeseen loss created quite 
a stir and an information vacuum. There were statements like, “what are we going to do 
now that this person is gone.” This is one example that “demonstrates the 
interdependence that can develop over time and may be unhealthy” (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, April 7, 2009). 
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3. Sharing Information 
It was virtually unanimous that information sharing has gotten better since 9/11. 
One senior homeland security official offered their personal account.  
Right after 9/11 it was the best I had ever seen and it was the only positive 
result from that event. People worked as hard as they possibly could; they 
worked together and it did not matter who got the credit for what, we just 
all had the common goal of going after the bad guys. (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, March 27, 2009) 
Another post-9/11 example was shared relative to the operational and personnel 
expansion that took place amongst the JTTF’s.  
Once 9/11 happened the FBI went from 35 JTTF’s to each FBI field office 
taking ownership of an individual JTTF. The concept behind the JTTF is 
that all of the people are housed in the same location and that way 
everybody is getting the information at the same time. (Interview with 
senior law enforcement official, April 10, 2009) 
One senior law enforcement official responsible for running one of the JTTF’s  
keeps their network of people working toward the common goal of information sharing 
by bringing them in on a monthly basis for a one hour meeting so the members can put a 
name to a face, introduce themselves, and discuss their agencies mission. Furthermore, 
they have Middle Eastern experts come in and do 45 minute mini-training sessions, 
which are invaluable to group members. The motto of this particular JTTF is “the more 
information we get out there the more information we will get back” (Interview with 
senior law enforcement official, April 10, 2009). 
There was one major obstacle to information sharing that was mentioned and that 
was systems access. That is, not everyone has access to each others electronic 
information systems. This is primarily because the systems are not capable of 
communicating with one another. So, instead of designing a new system, modifying an 
old system, or formulating MOU’s to establish systems access for external users, the 
users “bridge that gap by using people who work on task forces and at fusion centers. 
But, the systems still do not talk to one another” (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, April 1, 2009). 
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4. Reluctance to Share Information 
While the information sharing seems to have improved since 9/11, several 
examples highlight areas where the information sharing process can be improved upon. 
There was general agreement that there will always be interagency rivalries that can 
“stymie things at times” (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 26, 
2009). For example, there was a 2,000 pound marijuana load scheduled for a controlled 
delivery but the international port of entry did not want to turn over the “load” for fear 
that they would not get the statistic or credit for the seizure (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 26, 2009).   
Another example comes from one of the local law enforcement agencies who 
stated “we have become like news agencies. There is a race to see who can break the 
news and get the information out first. It is like trying to get the scoop if you will” 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 27, 2009).  
According to one senior homeland security official, as time has gone buy, and we 
are further away from 9/11 the eagerness and willingness to share information has gone 
by the wayside. It has gotten to the point where people do not share the information in a 
timely manner and they are not working together as much as they should (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, March 27, 2009). For example, local law enforcement 
feels that there is still reluctance by the FBI and DEA to share information with them 
(i.e., there is more information coming from the local police and going to the federal 
agencies rather than vice versa). The explanation for this guarded behavior is that “it is 
inherent in those organizations. For years, they have operated on a need to know basis, 
and they are having a hard time getting past that. They are really trying but they are still 
guarded” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 13, 2009).  
This supports the statement by one of the senior law enforcement officials that 
“the U.S. Government has a reputation that is all take and no give in the law enforcement 
community.” However, the senior official went on to say that this “reputation” is not 
entirely true. “You just have to be on the short list of people that can be trusted with that 
information” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009). It became 
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abundantly clear, especially after hearing statements like this, that as long as there is 
information sharing obstacles (e.g., technology, clearances, and classification of 
information) personal relationships will be the main driver of information sharing.   
F. SUMMARY  
The thought of criminal organizations cooperating with terrorists is a real 
possibility although the relationship may be short-lived. The driving force that may bring 
these two entities together would likely be financially based, but the end game for each 
entity would vary considerably.  
When asked the following question, “what is your view on the possibility of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations?” 14 of the 15 senior officials 
provided an answer and 71 percent or 10 out of 14 believe that it is possible for a 
relationship to occur between a criminal and a terrorist organization or that it is currently 
occurring (see Figure 4). There were a variety of reasons as to why this may occur or is 
already occurring. Many view terrorist organizations as a criminal organization because 
they behave in much the same manner even though their end goals may be different. That 
is, criminal organizations are in the business of making money to sustain their lifestyle 
while terrorist organizations need to make money to push their political agenda. In the 
end they both need the money to continue their operations and both engage in illicit 
activities to secure funding. This is what Shelley (n.d.) describes as “methods not 




Figure 4.   Relationship between Criminal and Terrorist Organization 
The benefit to the criminal organizations of having a relationship with a terrorist 
organization is, according to one senior law enforcement official, because “the terrorists 
know how to move large amounts of money, because the groups we believe are affiliated 
with terrorists are all just moving money, so the primary benefit for the criminal 
organizations (drug trafficking organizations) is legitimizing their money” (Interview 
with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009). The benefit to the terrorist 
organizations of having a relationship with a criminal organization is access to the 
smuggling pipeline.  
If someone (terrorist group) were to ask a human smuggling group to 
place a few people in the smuggling pipeline who are physically similar to 
the other people being smuggled (i.e., Hispanic looking) but in reality they 
are Arabs, no one is the wiser. So if they (terrorists) make an allegiance 
with these other organizations they are able to accomplish things without 
having the racial stereotype placed on them. (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 1, 2009) 
The terrorists know the cartels are powerful because they have a lot of money and 
they are ruthless. “The terrorists know if they pay the cartels money, they are going to get 
the job done, they are going to get the cell across” (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, March 31, 2009). Furthermore, the terrorists get “access to the 
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people who have been doing this for years and they know how to get people and product 
into the U.S.” (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 27, 2009). 
The remaining 29 percent or 4 out of 14 senior officials did not think a 
relationship would be possible between criminal and terrorist organizations (see Figure 
4). The primary reason was that if they were to get caught their business (drug 
trafficking) would be severely impacted in a negative manner. “They would have so 
much heat on them if it got out into the intelligence community that the criminal 
organizations (drug trafficking organizations) were actively affiliating with the 
terrorists.” Furthermore, “the U.S. Government will not stand for it” (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, March 30, 2009). So, the threat of losing their 
livelihood to move one high-value person may not fit the risk-reward model they are 
using for their day-to-day business.  
Another reason for not engaging in a relationship is that “human smuggling is a 
specialized area” and drug trafficking organizations “would move some thing on behalf 
of a terrorist organization rather than persons.” Furthermore, “people in drug trafficking 
like to feel a level of trust and control over the people working for them.” Consequently, 
“if you have a shady Middle Eastern type that wants to move things of a terrorist nature 
into the U.S. the drug movers might not feel that level of comfort with doing business 
with these folks” (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 7, 2009). 
While 71 percent, or 10 out of 14, believe it is possible that a relationship between 
criminal and terrorist organizations could occur, finding evidence of this occurring was 
less likely. When asked “what would you think would be considered evidence of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations?” ten of the senior officials 
responded and of those, 50 percent (5 out of 10) stated that they do not think that drug 




Figure 5.   Evidence of a Relationship between Criminals and Terrorists 
This is because they have not seen it, it has not been proven, or they just do not 
believe it will happen. If it was occurring, the belief is that law enforcement would 
discover the bodies being smuggled into the U.S. or law enforcement “would find 
individuals doing this.” Furthermore, “there has been no evidence of a big push of that 
kind (an alliance between criminal and terrorist organizations) through Mexico” 
(Interview with senior homeland security official, March 30, 2009). One senior homeland 
security official stated that, “it is a crocodile and an alligator; they do not live in the same 
water” referring to the terrorist and criminal organizations (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 25, 2009). The remaining 50 percent (5 out of 10) of 
senior officials could not point to concrete evidence of a relationship between criminal 
and terrorist organizations, but anecdotally they believe that the pieces of the puzzle are 
there waiting to be placed in the proper position for a relationship to occur.  
The frightening thing is that not only if they have the financial support but 
if they have the smuggling capability that means they have the logistics 
and the supply chain globally to move whatever they want to move. It 
doesn’t have to be dope. It’s a business (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, March 25, 2009).  
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In order to run a successful business, you need lots of cash, especially if it is an 
illegitimate business.  
The terrorists know, especially at the higher levels, that they need money 
to fund their activities but their primary motivation is terrorism not so 
much the money. The criminals, whether it is dope or human smuggling 
they want the money, they are just greedy. (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 1, 2009) 
Following the money to its origin was seen as a logical way to gather evidence on 
the criminal organizations. If law enforcement is able to trace where the money is moving 
to, they may also be able to establish what it is being used for; “to the Middle East 
(terrorism) or Mexico (drugs)” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 
2009). 
When asked about the possibility of criminal and terrorist organizations working 
together to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S., it was unanimous among all 15 
senior officials that it is possible. However, as identified earlier, 50 percent (5 out of 10) 
stated that there is no concrete evidence of a relationship between criminal and terrorist 
organizations (see Figure 6). Despite the lack of evidence, the possibility of a criminal 
and terrorist organization working together to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S. is 
viewed to be extremely high. However, one senior law enforcement official believes that 
“the human smuggling organizations are closer to coming together with the criminal 
organizations than they are with the terrorist organizations” (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 10, 2009). This is because the criminal organizations and 




Figure 6.   Possibility of Criminal and Terrorist Organization Working Together versus 
Evidence of a Relationship between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations 
There are some senior officials who believe that the criminal organizations would 
smuggle a person (even if they knew it was a terrorist) into the U.S., if the price was right 
(Interview with senior homeland security officials, March 26, 2009; March 30, 2009; 
April 7, 2009). Conversely, others believe that the criminal organizations would not 
smuggle a person (if they knew it was a terrorist) for any amount of money (Interview 
with senior homeland security officials, March 30, 2009; April 1, 2009).  
If they (criminal organization) thought it was just another person or human 
smuggling organization that wanted to get someone to the U.S. and they 
paid a premium then they probably would smuggle the person. If they 
knew it was a terrorist they would not do it. This would be a horrible 
business decision by the drug trafficking organizations. (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, April 1, 2009)  
It is also believed that this would not occur because the risks to everyone involved 
are greater than the payoff. “The terrorists want people coming in as students and 
business owners with clean documents that are not going to be scrutinized” (Interview 
with senior homeland security official, March 25, 2009). 
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If they are coming from a country that is a state sponsor of terrorism they 
are going to be provided good documents or they can apply for asylum. 
The hottest place to get documents is Venezuela. The important people, 
high level terrorist operatives, will get into the country using legitimate 
documents, in particular Venezuelan documents. (Interview with senior 
homeland security official, March 27, 2009) 
Therefore, if the terrorists or their operatives have legitimate “clean documents,” 
it would seem that they do not need the criminal or human smuggling organizations. 
However, as we have heard from senior homeland security officials, terrorists can obtain 
clean documents from Venezuela. These documents would be “legitimate” but would be 
obtained fraudulently through persons engaged in criminal activity and who are 
supporting terrorism.   
We know that 71 percent (10 out of 14) of the senior officials believe that a 
relationship is possible between criminal and terrorist organizations. However, 50 percent 
(5 out of 10) do not believe this will occur because there is no evidence while the other 
50 percent (5 out of 10) believe it will occur, but they too have no evidence of this 
occurring. The 50 percent that believes this will occur said that money would be the one 
factor that could link them together. When asked “what current/future factors do you 
believe would allow for the formation of a relationship between criminal and terrorist 
organizations in terms of human smuggling” the number one answer was money.  
In terms of human smuggling, the money is the motivating factor. “I do not think 
they care who they are moving. If someone is going to pay a premium to move someone 
into the U.S., then I think they will do it” (Interview with senior homeland security 
official, April 7, 2009). A similar view was that “it has to be profitable on the Mexican 
side; for the drug trafficking organizations. They are only going to be involved in 
businesses that are lucrative and sustaining. The Mexican groups would view this as 
purely a business relationship” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 




Another view is that the human smugglers are going to have to select smuggling 
routes outside of their established corridors because law enforcement is forcing them 
away from their comfort zone. These underutilized and less established routes (e.g., small 
plane and small boats) were also discussed earlier.  
In terms of Mexico; ships, large sea vessels, and aircraft are things they 
(human smugglers in Mexico) do not currently use the way the deep 
pockets of terrorist organizations already have access to. The terrorists 
have the ability to bring these other guys a different method of smuggling. 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 1, 2009) 
Because terrorist organizations are so secretive, it does not make sense that they 
would open up their doors to persons outside of their organization and engage in 
smuggling for hire. This would exponentially increase the likelihood of exposing their 
illicit activities and their operatives.   
The views were varied when it came to the possibility of forming a future 
relationship between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. For example, “their 
(drug trafficking organizations) goals are so different than the terrorists that I cannot 
think of anything that would bring them together” (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 10, 2009). Furthermore, when it comes to working with 
terrorist organizations there may be good reasons why these criminal organizations would 
draw the line.  
I think philosophically drug trafficking organizations realize that forming 
a partnership like that is very, very dangerous for them as well. The law 
enforcement scrutiny on them would be wound up considerably. They 
have their own business plans and forming a relationship with a terrorist 
organization is probably not smart from a business standpoint. From a 
cost-benefit analysis it may not make a lot of sense to form that kind of 
partnership. (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 30, 
2009) 
An alternative view was described in the following way. 
As long as the terrorist organization portrayed its criminal side it could 
deal with other criminal organizations. This is the point at which a terrorist 
organization could slide its members through but they would have to have 
had a long term criminal relationship to where it is seen as another 
criminal organization and not as a terrorist organization. (Interview with 
senior homeland security official, April 1, 2009) 
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One factor that may “force” a terrorist and criminal organization to engage in a 
partnership, although it will likely be short-term, is timing.  
Let’s say there is an urgent operation that they (terrorists) want done and 
they need a hit squad now and need to get into the U.S. as soon as 
possible. As long as the drug trafficking organizations produce what the 
terrorists want, the terrorists will keep using them. (Interview with senior 
law enforcement official, March 31, 2009) 
Because an urgent terrorist operation would happen so quickly, the chances of law 
enforcement missing the signs or indicators is greatly increased and the chances of 
interrupting it are greatly decreased. However, if the terrorists are patient in their 
planning, which has been their modus operandi, law enforcement may have a better 
chance at interrupting their operation. For example, “as they (terrorists) get closer to 
whatever their timeline is on when they are going to hit us, that would increase their need 
to build a stronger relationship with the drug trafficking organizations or other criminal 
organizations” (Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 27, 2009). So, if 
law enforcement identifies any activity between these entities it may be an indication that 
the planning stages of a terrorist event are being finalized. The way that this will be 
identified is through information sharing.  
The ability to prevent terrorists from penetrating our borders depends on the 
cooperation of each and every border agency regardless of their affiliation (i.e., federal, 
state, or local). Homeland security leaders and law enforcement professionals must 
establish a personal relationship with partner agencies. This can be accomplished through 
regular meetings, work-groups, or common agency goals. Furthermore, agencies must 
learn what resources their partner agencies (federal, state, and local) can provide and in 
return provide this same reciprocity.  
Homeland security and law enforcement leaders must reward participation in task 
forces and working groups as a way of recognizing their value and contribution to the 
information sharing process. The trust, relationships, and communication that is 
developed out of these task forces is invaluable when it comes to thwarting criminal and 
terrorist organizations attempting to cross our borders. Without these groups, law 
enforcement and homeland security officials are working with blinders. Conversely, by 
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expanding or enhancing these groups it will allow for a more complete, accurate, and 
timely operating picture of criminal and terrorist organizations.    
We must not forget that the terrorist and criminal organizations leverage current 
technology and the internet to their advantage. They are able to get information “real 
time” on their illicit goods, as well as the whereabouts of any law enforcement personnel. 
Therefore, the development of any new computer system must meet current technology 
standards and have the capability of interconnecting with the most sophisticated or 
simplistic system. Until this can be accomplished, homeland security and law 
enforcement professionals will need to create opportunities to participate in monthly or 
quarterly meetings or mini-conferences. Unfortunately, homeland security will continue 
to be behind the information curve unless and until there is an automated and simple way 
to share real time information across jurisdictions.      
In order to win the fight against terrorism, everyone responsible for collecting and 
disseminating homeland security and law enforcement information must recognize that 
the flow of information must be a two-way street. Furthermore, the federal government 
must provide the statutory and regulatory authority for designated homeland security and 
law enforcement agencies to share information freely and without reprisal. While this last 
step takes an act of congress, it is essential in tearing down the information sharing 
obstacles that agencies face due to legal or bureaucratic obstacles. 
Quite often history can provide insight and support for why events taking place 
present day are occurring in a particular manner. For example, there are numerous 
individuals as well as groups who belong to criminal and terrorist organizations that 
engage in nefarious behaviors in support of terrorism (e.g., human smuggling). The 
application of this historical knowledge, obtained through case studies, may provide 
additional support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between criminal and 
terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling.     
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IV. HUMAN SMUGGLING FACILITATED BY CRIMINAL AND 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS   
Two detailed case examples were reviewed in order to show that a nexus exists 
between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. By illustrating 
the details of these cases, the reader will be able to see the connection and relationship 
between terrorist organizations, human smuggling, and the use of human smuggling 
routes protected by criminal organizations. Because human smuggling is a criminal 
activity, this further establishes the link between criminal and terrorist organizations.  
More specifically, these cases were chosen to a) reflect an example of a terrorist 
operative involved in criminal activity who was smuggled across the U.S.-Mexico border 
and b) to demonstrate an example of a terrorist sympathizer who engaged in criminal 
activity to smuggle other terrorist sympathizers and possibly terrorist operatives across 
the U.S.-Mexico border. These two cases point to the continued willingness and resolve 
by terrorists and terrorist organizations, even in a post-9/11 heightened security 
environment, to penetrate the U.S. border by any means necessary to support terrorism. 
A. MAHMOUD YOUSSEF KOURANI 
The first case involves a Hezbollah operative named Mahmoud Youssef Kourani 
who, according to the indictment dated November 19, 2003, was a member, fighter, 
recruiter and fund raiser for Hezbollah. Furthermore, the indictment states that Kourani 
received specialized training in radical Shiite fundamentalism, weaponry, spy craft, and 
counterintelligence in Lebanon and Iran. The indictment goes on to state that Kourani 
recruited people in Lebanon to become members of Hezbollah, and he oversaw their 
applications and detailed background checks. Kourani also held the position of fund 
raising solicitor for Hezbollah near Tyre, Lebanon. The indictment also identifies 
Kourani’s brother, Hezbollah Chief of Military Security for Southern Lebanon, as a co-
conspirator who oversaw Kourani’s activities within the U.S. (United States of America, 
2003).  
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Kourani was able to travel to Mexico from Lebanon through what is known as the 
“Lebanon-Tijuana” pipeline. He bribed a Mexican consulate official in Beirut by paying 
$3,000 to get a Mexican visa (Arrillaga & Rodriguez, 2005). This allowed him to travel 
from Lebanon to Mexico where he was able to connect with a human smuggling 
operation. The indictment and available literature do not address whether or not the group 
that smuggled Kourani was aware of his terrorist affiliation and who he really was.  
Both Kourani and one other man were smuggled across the southwest border on 
February 4, 2001 in the trunk of a car. Kourani employed a Shia Muslim doctrine of 
concealment known as “taqiyah” while in the U.S. He avoided mosques, Shiite religious 
rituals, and shaved his beard while he was in, what he considered the hostile territory of 
the U.S. (United States of America, 2003). While in the U.S., Kourani was reportedly 
involved in some fund raising for Hezbollah and sent them around $40,000 during his 
stay in the U.S. Furthermore, Kourani was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme whereby 
he would by burnt out homes in Detroit, make cosmetic repairs on the outside, leaving 
the inside untouched, and would collaborate with an appraiser to get an inflated home 
value. He would then get a criminal associate to buy the house, get a loan on the home, 
default on the loan, and share the illegal proceeds with Kourani. Kourani was eventually 
indicted in 2003 on charges of conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist 
organization (i.e., Hezbollah) and received four-and-one-half years in prison.  
Kourani used bribery to obtain a visa, was smuggled into the U.S., engaged in 
criminal activity while in the U.S. in support of Hezbollah, and was the brother of the 
Hezbollah Chief of Military Security for Southern Lebanon. It is clear from Kourani’s 
past and his affiliations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and in the U.S. that he was engaging 
in criminal activity while in the U.S. in support of Hezbollah, a terrorist organization.  
B. SALIM BOUGHADER MUCHARRAFILLE 
The second case involves Salim Boughader Mucharrafille, who is of Lebanese-
Mexican origin, and is also a well known human smuggler. Boughader, just like Kourani, 
was also leveraging the “Lebanon-Tijuana” human smuggling pipeline. His formal 
occupation was that of a café owner in Tijuana. Interestingly some of the people who 
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frequented his café worked at the U.S. consulate. Unbeknownst to his government 
clientele, the La Libanesa café owner was also involved in the nefarious movement of 
Lebanese migrants into the U.S. This would not be an uncommon venture for terrorists 
who, according to O’Neil (2007), will engage in legal and illegal means to satisfy the 
need of human smuggling. It would seem that Boughader fits into this category.   
Boughader was organized when it came to record keeping. He had a notebook 
with the names, phone numbers, and date of arrival at his restaurant of his smuggling 
clients. In another notebook, he had the names and numbers of his restaurant customers 
and their favorite dishes (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005).  
Boughader’s clientele reportedly told U.S. and Mexican officials that they paid 
several thousand dollars for fraudulent visas from the consulate office in Beirut, so they 
could make their way from Lebanon to Mexico and eventually into the U.S. (this is the 
same modus operandi used by Kourani). In fact, one of Boughader’s clients worked for a 
Hezbollah-owned television network that glorified suicide bombers (United States, 
2006a).  
It is well known that Hezbollah has a significant network across the U.S. with a 
focus on areas with large Lebanese and Arab communities (e.g., Dearborn, MI and New 
York, NY) (Strindberg, 2003). Furthermore, Hezbollah is closely allied with Iran and 
serves as a surrogate for Iran (United States, 2006b). In fact, according to a Treasury 
Department official Iran provides $100 million dollars a year to Hezbollah (Vardi, 2006). 
Funding for Hezbollah is obtained through a variety of ways to include donations, 
tax fraud, and cigarette smuggling (Strindberg, 2003). In fact, in 2002 two Lebanese men 
were convicted of financing Hezbollah with $2 million dollars in cigarette sales (United 
States, 2006b). In another case, Imad Hamadeh of Dearborn Heights, MI and Theodore 
Schenk of Miami Beach, FL were involved in cigarette smuggling that avoided over $20 
million dollars in taxes of which part was sent to Hezbollah. It is alleged that these two 
had ties with the higher level Hezbollah officials and charged a resistance tax in addition 
to the black market price (Vardi, 2006). 
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Up until December 2002, when Boughader was arrested, he had smuggled about 
200 Lebanese, to include Hezbollah sympathizers, into the United States (Arrillaga & 
Rodriguez, 2005). Just to show how closely the human smuggling organizations work 
together, it was reported that other human smugglers continued to assist the Hezbollah 
(Lebanese) migrants with entering the U.S. from Tijuana, after Boughader had been 
arrested. According to Boughader, even if the officers at the border do stop you, the 
document checks being done at the border are poor (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005).  
This criminal activity of bribing government officials to obtain fraudulent 
documents, coupled with providing monetary support to a terrorist organization establishes 
the link between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. While 
Boughader was a smuggler who facilitated the movement of Lebanese migrants and Kourani 
was smuggled, the methods used by both were very much the same. That is, they engaged in 
criminal activity (bribing government officials) to get to Mexico and worked with human 
smugglers (criminal organizations) to illegally enter the U.S. at which time they engaged 
in fund raising to support Hezbollah (a terrorist organization).   
C. SUMMARY 
In the case of both Kourani and Boughader, there was a direct connection with 
criminal activity (i.e., bribery) that took place in Beirut whereby both Kourani, and the 
clientele served by Boughader, paid Mexican consulate officials several thousand dollars 
for Mexican visas so they could travel from Lebanon to Mexico. Once in Mexico, both 
Kourani and clientele of Boughader leveraged human smuggling organizations like those 
of Boughader to illegally enter the U.S. This smuggling route, known as the “Lebanon-
Tijuana” human smuggling pipeline, was used by Boughader to smuggle 200 or so 
Lebanese, to include Hezbollah sympathizers, into the U.S. Once in the U.S., Kourani 
was reportedly involved in fundraising activity for Hezbollah and sent them 
approximately $40,000 over the course of his stay in the U.S. There appears to be a clear 
connection between criminal activity, human smuggling, and support of terrorist 
organizations through fundraising in these two examples. However, it is also important to 
review groups that engage in criminal and terrorist behaviors as this too provides support 
and evidence of the existence of relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations.  
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V. THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY’S MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM 
This case study involves the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and is intended to 
demonstrate their movement between a terrorist organization and one that also engages in 
criminal activity. Like the previous two case studies, the IRA engaged in both criminal 
activities as well as provided monetary support for terrorist activities. While the IRA 
violence and terrorist activities were directed at the British government, it appears that 
the Lebanese that were smuggled into the U.S. may have been engaged in fund raising to 
support terrorist activity but had no intention of carrying out terrorist attacks on U.S. soil 
(Strindberg, 2003; United States, 2006).     
A. EVENTS THAT GAVE BIRTH TO THE IRA 
For over eight centuries, Ireland has been at odds with the British beginning with 
a “land grab” that took place in Northern Ireland in 1171 by King Henry II of England 
who was appointed the King of Ireland (Hahn, 1989). It is historical events like this that 
have driven the long-term mistrust and anger that has been passed down through the 
generations and engrained in the Irish people. The abuse of the Irish people continued 
evidenced by the Penal Laws that were passed in 1691 prohibiting Irish Catholics from 
voting, owning land, holding public office, bearing arms, receiving an education, or 
entering a profession (O’Loughlin, n.d.). The Potato Famine in 1845 robbed the Irish 
people of much needed food, shipped to London, resulting in many deaths due to 
starvation (Gavin, 2000). This lengthy onslaught of abuse and mistreatment eventually 
boiled over leading to the1916 uprising, albeit unsuccessful, by the Irish whereby a group 
of protestors proclaimed sovereignty over Ireland. Their protest failed to win back their 
sovereignty, but what developed out of this event became known as the Easter uprising, 
which gave birth to the infamous Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Hahn, 1989).    
B. IRA TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE 
Between 1916 and 1921, the IRA engaged in a campaign of violence and 
terrorism that was so overwhelming that a Treaty had to be established. This Treaty 
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became known as the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which partitioned 26 of the 32 counties of 
Ireland into the Republic of Ireland leaving the remaining six northern counties under 
British rule (White, 1997). Gerry Adams (1995) believes that partitioning was imposed as 
an alternative to war. However, one could argue that partitioning resulted in the IRA 
declaring war.   
The IRA continued their violent campaign to retake the six northern counties and 
in 1969 military troops were introduced as a way to control the rioting in Northern 
Ireland (Hahn, 1989). In 1971, as a further method of attempted suppression, the Special 
Powers Act of 1922 was reinstated that allowed for detainment of suspect terrorists for up 
to 48 hours without charges (Hahn, 1989). The introduction of military troops and the 
reinstatement of internment only stoked the IRA terrorism machine. For example, in 
January 1972, known as Bloody Sunday, thousands of protestors voiced their 
disagreement over detainment (internment) policies. Unfortunately, fourteen protestors 
died (Della Porta, 1995) further fueling the anger and rage of the Irish people.  
It is not surprising that the IRA terrorism continued when you consider how the 
Irish people were treated. They were discriminated against, excluded from participation 
in a civilized political process, and underwent excessive and unwarranted force by the 
military (Crenshaw, 1981). On Friday, July 21, 1972 (otherwise known as Bloody 
Friday), the IRA conducted 22 bombings, primarily focused on public areas (e.g., bus 
stations, shopping centers), killing 11 people. This was payback for the 14 protestors that 
were killed on “Bloody Sunday.” In August 1979, the IRA assassinated a British war 
hero by blowing up his fishing boat.  
The IRA was beginning to gain more and more power but knew that if they 
continued down the road of terrorism and violence that the gains would not be as 
significant as the losses. Some of the IRA members recognized this. For example, in 
1981 convicted IRA member Bobby Sands started a hunger strike in an attempt to force 
the British government to grant political prisoner status to imprisoned IRA members 
(Hahn, 1989). His attempt was unsuccessful, but this was an early indicator that the IRA 
was moving away from a strict “violence and terrorist” mentality and inching ever so 
slowly toward a more legitimate, albeit political, avenue for expressing themselves.   
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The IRA onslaught of terrorist activity continued, and in 1987, they bombed a war 
memorial ceremony killing 11 and wounding over 60 elderly. In August 1988, an 
unmarked military bus with British troops was bombed by the IRA, killing 8 soldiers 
(Hahn, 1989). Because of the IRA’s relentless campaign of violence and terrorism, the 
British Secretary of State, in 1989, stated that the IRA could not be completely defeated. 
Furthermore, the possibility of benefits was on the table if the IRA should choose to end 
their violence (O’Kane, n.d.). 
These benefits began to materialize by the mid 1990s in what is known as 
inclusion. The process of inclusion involved bringing the IRA terrorists into the political 
arena rather than try to protect everyone in society from their terrorist campaign (O'Kane, 
n.d.). This approach is similar to the adage, keep your friends close but keep your 
enemies closer. Despite this “political inclusion,” the IRA moved away from their 
terrorist campaign, although not completely, and began to engage in criminal activity as a 
way to fund their organization. They still needed money to operate, and as a fledgling 
political organization, they were not making great strides at legitimate fund raising 
activities.  
C. IRA CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Irish law enforcement officials stated that all of the Irish terrorist organizations 
are engaged in some type of criminal activity to support their organizations financially 
(United States, 2000). For example, a theft of $50 million dollars from a bank in Belfast 
is believed to be the work of the IRA. In the process of recovering the stolen money, a 
large money-laundering scheme was uncovered, which involved an effort by the IRA to 
buy a bank in Bulgaria in cooperation with an east European crime syndicate. This is 
evidence that the terrorists and organized criminals are linked, and that they both require 
money to operate, as well as an avenue to move that money (Hall, 2005). 
Donal Patrick Moyna, a member of the IRA, was arrested carrying $13,500 in 




seizure of $2 million in counterfeit U.S. currency that was similar to those being used by 
Moyna. It turns out that the money was being used to fund travel for IRA members 
around the world (Lyall, 1989).   
According to Irish law enforcement officials, Irish Republican terrorists are expert 
at international smuggling operations and have established relationships with other 
terrorist organizations and criminal organizations throughout the world (United State, 
2000). Furthermore, the IRA controls the smuggling of untaxed tobacco products, 
untaxed liquor, and counterfeit consumer goods into Northern Ireland (United States, 
2000).    
The eighth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission states that the IRA 
is involved in reselling agricultural diesel fuel, smuggling tobacco, importing Chinese 
mobile phone chips to avoid tracing, and manipulating poker machines in British arcades 
(Burleigh, 2006). Furthermore, the IRA is reportedly spying on public officials and 
operating an organized crime network six months after it declared an end to its armed 
campaign. Additionally, diehard IRA breakaway republicans reportedly hijacked a taxi 
driver and planted a bomb in the vehicle not long after the IRA made a pledge to disarm. 
The bomb was defused by army technicians after the driver had abandoned the vehicle 
about a quarter-mile from the police station (the intended target) (DePasquale, 2005). 
According to Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, they are no longer engaged in 
terrorism and the “intelligence gathering” is being used to aid the IRA’s political wing 
(Lavery, 2006). However, according to Lavery (2006) Prime Minister Tony Blare 
demanded that the IRA stop its criminal activities. He stated that the IRA has made 
significant progress, but that they are still involved in the lucrative trade of cigarettes and 
gasoline. 
In March of 2009, Irish republican terrorist groups killed two British soldiers and 
a police officer. The president of Republican Sinn Fein, Ruairi O’Bradaigh, a 60-year 
veteran of the IRA said such attacks would be repeated in the near future (McDonald, 
2009). O’Bradaigh warned, after Sinn Fein encouraged people to help the police, young 
Catholics in Northern Ireland that they would be in harms way and it was wrong to assist 
British forces (McDonald, 2009). O’Bradaigh could be referred to as “old school” in that 
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he reminisces about the British invasion of Ireland going back hundreds of years and his 
desire for a 32-county republic. In fact, he has said that as long as the British remain in 
part of Ireland, there will always be an IRA of some kind to stand up to them (McDonald, 
2009). According to DePasquale (2005), the veterans of the IRA know no other way of 
life. 
Terrorist groups like the IRA and al-Qaeda have been marginalized in numerous 
ways. Group members have come to disagree on the goals or philosophy of the group, 
there have been splinter groups formed, members have been captured or killed 
(Weinberg, 1991) and at times there has been such public outrage over the group’s 
activities that they cannot attract new members (Hahn, 1989). But, DePasquale (2005) 
argues that it only takes a few rogue individuals to disrupt the transition from terrorism to 
normalcy. It would appear that the IRA has taken parallel paths on criminal activity and 
terrorist activity in that it is still engaging in both and has no desire to slow down or halt 
either activity.  
D. SUMMARY 
In the case of the IRA, they have been engaged in a multi-decade long terrorist 
campaign in an effort to restore Ireland to its original 32 counties. Primarily, the battle is 
over Northern Ireland and the six counties that are currently ruled by the British. The IRA 
has slowly moved from a terrorist organization to a political organization that is also 
involved in multiple criminal schemes in order to fund its activities. However, there is 
still an IRA terrorist element that simply refuses to go away quietly and has vowed to 
continue its terrorist attacks. The IRA’s criminal activity involves tobacco smuggling, 
liquor smuggling, and counterfeit merchandise. This is not unlike the fund raising 
activities that have been used by Hezbollah in the U.S. While the IRA may not be 
involved in human smuggling, they have, and continue to this day, clearly vacillated 
between terrorist and criminal activity.  
Earlier discussions revealed examples of individuals involved in criminal 
behavior in support of terrorism and involvement in human smuggling whereas the IRA 
provides an example of a group engaged in criminal and terrorist activity. Furthermore, 
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there was a discussion of how both the interview data obtained from homeland security 
and law enforcement professionals and the scholarly literature provide further support for 
the existence of a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of 
human smuggling. This information becomes much more conclusive in terms of a nexus 
between criminal and terrorist organizations and human smuggling when it is combined 
and analyzed collectively. 
 
 





VI. THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN SMUGGLING 
This analytic review encompasses scholarly literature, data collected from 15 
senior homeland security and law enforcement officials, as well as case studies. The 
purpose of this analysis was to determine the existence of a nexus between criminal and 
terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling and what it means in terms of 
securing the southern border of the U.S. This is important to law makers, policy makers, 
and decision makers who deal with criminal organizations (i.e., drug trafficking 
organizations, human smuggling organizations, and criminal gangs) and terrorist 
organizations because of the overlap in illicit activity that exists between these entities. 
Furthermore, the threat, as well as the actual act of corruption that occurs on the U.S.-
Mexico border, presents a vulnerability that may result in consequences equal to or worse 
than 9/11. Lastly, while criminal and terrorist organizations may be collaborating, or have 
the potential to collaborate, coupled with the fact that a U.S. official charged with 
protecting the U.S.-Mexico border may be the weak link in U.S. security, there are short 
and long-term solutions to minimize these threats in terms of information sharing that can 
be put in place with minimal effort. 
Human smuggling is a lucrative business that is sanctioned by drug trafficking 
organizations, protected by criminal gangs, and propagated by human smuggling rings 
both large and small. The financial gain from human smuggling is the number one factor 
that brings these groups together. The routes used to smuggle people into the U.S run as 
far south as South America and are protected by criminal gangs like MS-13 who are 
working for or with the drug trafficking organizations and Muslim businessmen. This 
relationship exists because these groups share the same smuggling routes that are used to 
smuggle illegal drugs, weapons, and any other commodity that brings a worthwhile 
profit. This is supported by data obtained from senior officials who stated that human 
smuggling and drug trafficking organizations are similar in that they use the same 
established infrastructure, and they both rely on a trusted illicit network (sometimes the 
same one). 
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The exploitation of these smuggling routes by terrorists is a real possibility and is 
of concern to U.S. policy makers. For example, the case of Mahmoud Youssef Kourani 
and Salim Boughader Mucharrafille are clear examples of how corruption and bribery in 
Beirut, Lebanon can be used to secure visas for travel to Mexico with the goal of being 
smuggled into the U.S. The smuggling pipeline exists not only from Lebanon to Tijuana 
but also from South and Central America to Mexico and into the U.S.  
Leveraging these established smuggling pipelines is not the only way to enter the 
U.S. undetected, and in fact may not be the preferred method, although it is number two 
in the most preferred methods identified by the senior officials who participated in the 
interviews. A total of nine different ways to enter the U.S were identified by these senior 
officials: illegal entry, legal entry, fraudulent documents, small boat, Hispanic 
appearance, asylum, corruption, small airplane, and tunnel. All of these methods require 
some type of cooperation with criminal or human smuggling organizations and in some 
cases with terrorist affiliated organizations. For example, entering the U.S. as a foreign 
student is just one way mentioned to enter the country legally. A person using legitimate 
documents with a clean record is another way to enter the U.S. legally. As we know, all 
19 of the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. legally and were supported by and affiliated 
with al-Qaeda who is a known terrorist organization. When it comes to illegal, entry the 
case of Mahmoud Youssef Kourani comes to mind. He leveraged the Lebanon-Tijuana 
pipeline and was eventually smuggled into the U.S. in the trunk of a car. Another 
example of illegal entry, or the facilitation of illegal entry, is the case of Salim 
Boughader. He facilitated the illegal entry of over 200 Lebanese into the U.S., many of 
whom were Hezbollah sympathizers.        
According to Wilson and Sullivan (2007), as well as the senior officials who were 
interviewed, criminal organizations and terrorist organizations are violent, use 
intimidation and coercion, are transnational, and are all about the money. Their main 
motivation is money but their end goal may be very different. For example, the terrorist 
and criminal organizations may both engage in drug smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and 
weapons smuggling for profit, but the criminal organizations are doing it for the power 
and to support their lifestyle, whereas the terrorist organizations main goal is to advance 
 73
their political and terrorist agenda with minimal sustenance (Townsend & Mili, 2008). 
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a case that illustrates this from the terrorist 
perspective. The IRA is a known terrorist organization that has vacillated between 
politics and criminal activity. They have engaged in cigarette smuggling, liquor 
smuggling, and counterfeit merchandise sales to support their political and terrorist 
activity with little focus on a lavish lifestyle. 
While it may not be difficult to find law enforcement or government personnel 
who have direct experience with battling the IRA, it was difficult to find someone who 
had experience dealing directly with a terrorist organization among the 15 senior officials 
who were interviewed. What was clear among these senior officials was that criminal 
gangs were working with the drug trafficking organizations to protect and secure the 
supply routes from Mexico into the U.S. What was less clear was direct evidence from 
senior officials that terrorist and criminal organizations were working together to 
smuggle operatives into the U.S. However, 71 percent (10 out of 14) believe that it is 
possible for a relationship to occur between a criminal and terrorist organization or that it 
is already occurring. As mentioned previously, money is the motivating factor that would 
bring these two entities together. According to the senior officials, the benefits of a 
relationship to the criminal organization is that the terrorists know how to move large 
amounts of money and the benefit to the terrorists is that they get access to the smuggling 
pipeline.  
While earning money may be the unifying factor in a relationship between a 
criminal and terrorist organization, spending money by these entities may be their best 
investment, if they truly want to harm the U.S. If the criminal or terrorist organizations 
spend just $3,000 to $5,000 to corrupt a U.S. border official to allow a vehicle to pass 
through the border without inspection, it would be a great return on their investment. 
There were over 200 public employees charged with helping move narcotics or illegal 
immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican border between 2004 and 2006. This trend is 
expected to continue given that the Border Patrol hired between six to eight thousand new 
agents between 2007 and 2008. This rate of hiring in such a short period of time cannot 
possibly allow for due diligence when it comes to background investigations according to 
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the senior officials and scholarly literature. To make matters worse, the drug trafficking 
organizations are recruiting young men and women, with no criminal history, to get hired 
by the Border Patrol in order to facilitate smuggling activity. This is effectively a 100 
percent guarantee that whatever is being smuggled will make it into the U.S.  
The reasons for corruption vary. There were 47 percent (7 out of 15) of the senior 
officials that said “money and greed” was the primary reason for succumbing to 
corruption while another 20 percent (3 out of 15) identified family relationships as their 
reason. Whatever the reason may be, the impact is potentially quite devastating. Out of 
all the past corruption cases, as well as the ones that have yet to occur, we will never truly 
know who or what was or will be allowed into the U.S. undetected. This is why 
corruption is such an attractive option to criminal and terrorist organizations.  
Fifty percent (5 out of 10) of the senior officials do not believe that the drug 
trafficking organizations would engage in a relationship with a terrorist organization 
because they have not seen evidence of this occurring. That is, they believe that if it was 
occurring, we (law enforcement) would be aware of it. Furthermore, 29 percent (4 out of 
10) of the senior officials did not think a relationship was possible between a criminal 
and a terrorist organization. The following reason was also given as to why a criminal 
and terrorist organization would not partner. Put simply, it would be a bad business 
decision for a criminal organization (i.e., drug trafficking, human smuggling, or criminal 
gang) to associate with terrorists because there would be so much scrutiny and pressure 
from international law enforcement and intelligence agencies that life as they know it 
would cease to exist (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 1, 2009). 
One senior official illustrated this point with the case of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena 
Salazar, an undercover DEA agent who was kidnapped and murdered in 1985 by a drug 
trafficking organization who discovered his identity. The senior official stated that as a 
result of this event “the border shut down, and when the border shuts down it hurts their 
(criminal organizations) business” (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
March 25, 2009). It would be expected that this type of response from the U.S. 
Government would be amplified, if evidence surfaced that criminal and terrorist 
organizations were actively collaborating.  
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Conversely, it was unanimous among senior officials that it was possible for a 
criminal and terrorist organization to work together to smuggle terrorist operatives into 
the U.S. However, as identified earlier, 50 percent (5 out of 10) stated that there is no 
concrete evidence of a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations. Despite 
the lack of evidence, the possibility of a criminal and terrorist organization working 
together to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S. is viewed to be extremely high. 
Again, the primary draw that would bring them together is money. Some of the senior 
officials believe that criminal organizations would knowingly smuggle a terrorist, if the 
price was right, while others believe that criminal organizations would not knowingly 
smuggle a terrorist for any amount of money.  
When it comes to current or future factors that would allow for the formation of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling, 
the number one answer, according to the senior officials, was money. The motivating 
factor is money and any business venture engaged in by the criminal organizations (i.e., 
drug trafficking, criminal gangs, and human smuggling) must be profitable for them 
before they even consider it as a viable venture. One senior official suggested that a 
terrorist organization could deal with criminal organizations, as long as it continually 
showed its criminal side, and must have done so on a long-term basis to have established 
a trusted relationship, thereby masking the terrorism aspect of the organization. 
Therefore, the criminal organization would never know that they were actually dealing 
with a terrorist organization. Effectively, the terrorist organization would be putting up a 
fabricated criminal operation all the while having access to the smuggling pipelines, as 
well as protection provided by the criminal gangs, to move their operatives into the U.S.  
If a long-term relationship failed to come to fruition, it is believed that a short-
term relationship between a criminal organization and terrorist organization might occur 
with the explicit knowledge of both parties. For example, if the terrorist organization 
required an immediate need for operatives to get into the U.S. to conduct an operation, 
and the drug trafficking organizations could make this happen, it is believed that the two 
parties would temporarily cooperate in order to achieve their goal.  
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As far as current or future factors that would prevent the formation of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling, 
the number one answer, according to senior officials, was strong communication and 
information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies. While all ten of the 
agencies represented in the data sample reportedly have a level of communication and 
cooperation that is unprecedented, it is apparent that relationships are what make the 
information sharing wheel turn. Knowing that you can pick up the phone and get an 
immediate and straight forward response from a partner agency is reportedly based on 
years of working together and a high level of trust.  
It was apparent that crisis situations like 9/11 have actually enhanced the 
information sharing process. Everyone that was interviewed stated that the information 
sharing has improved since 9/11, but some see the information sharing pendulum swinging 
back toward pre-9/11 levels. The task force and working groups are a great venue to establish 
relationships and foster information sharing, but each agency has to generate statistics in 
order to justify their programs and their efforts. This is evidenced by the fact that there is 
some reluctance to share information with other entities, as they may get the credit for 
breaking a case, apprehending a suspect, or seizing a narcotics load based on the information 
you shared with them. According to one senior official, the further we get from 9/11 there is 
a lack of eagerness and willingness to share information.  
It is almost as if another terrorist event or significant disaster like Hurricane 
Katrina needs to occur before information sharing can be taken to the next level. The 
necessity to share information is before an event occurs at our Nation’s border or on our 
soil. For example, the 9/11 report stated that the CIA had valuable information about 
some of the 9/11 attackers but did not share this with the FBI because they said they 
needed approval from the Justice Department. The report went on to state that prior to 
9/11, intelligence collection and dissemination was closely guarded and frequently 
protected due to turf wars between federal agencies (National Commission, 2004). It 
would appear that we may be headed back to a pre-9/11 mentality according to our senior 
officials. Despite some needed improvements in the information sharing process, the 
senior homeland security and law enforcement professionals did express several ways to 
disrupt human smuggling efforts by criminal and terrorist organizations. 
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VII. HOW TO DISRUPT CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS FROM HUMAN SMUGGLING 
All 15 senior officials were asked the following question, “what current/future 
factors do you believe would prevent the formation of a relationship between criminal 
and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling?” The number one answer was 
strong communication and information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies. 
There were several other answers provided by senior officials that warrant further 
discussion.  
One of the ways that the U.S. can disrupt criminal organizations is to seek help 
from the Mexican government. According to one senior law enforcement official, they 
have “shown a willingness to extradite people to the U.S.” (Interview with senior law 
enforcement official, April 3, 2009).  Additionally, the U.S. has “shown a willingness to 
give them (the Mexican government) aid (e.g., intelligence, advisors, or money)” to stop 
the illegal flow of drugs, human smuggling, and whatever else may be smuggled from 
Mexico into the U.S. (Interview with senior law enforcement official, April 3, 2009). The 
bottom line, according to one senior law enforcement official, is that “we have to make 
them successful in Mexico; I think it is critical to the security of this country” (Interview 
with senior law enforcement official, April 3, 2009). 
Tightening up the borders is another way to deter criminal and terrorist 
organizations from engaging in a relationship. For example, the border fence that has 
been under construction, and the center of much controversy, seems to have had a 
positive impact on deterring drug and human traffickers. “The wall/fence that has been 
built across the entire southern border of California has made a huge difference. The days 
of just shooting across the border in a jeep or an SUV for a quick hit are long gone” 
(Interview with senior law enforcement official, March 30, 2009). One senior homeland 




The idea is not to jump from area-to-area but to secure all of the areas. We 
have to keep up with them and not abandon the previously thwarted 
smuggling routes; we cannot just shift the same resources away from one 
area to where the new problem is. (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, April 7, 2009) 
In the end, even after working with the Mexican government and tightening up 
the U.S. border with more agents and a fence, certain criminal organizations may be more 
difficult to penetrate according to one senior homeland security official. For example, 
“the drug groups roll their phones over every two weeks, which makes it difficult to 
monitor via electronic means” (Interview with senior homeland security official, March 
26, 2009). This is critical because electronic surveillance is also a method that allows the 
U.S. to “get to the upper tiers of a criminal organization and focus on a long-term 
approach to eliminate the entire criminal organization” (Interview with senior homeland 
security official, March 26, 2009). We must “make sure that the criminal organizations 
know that the U.S. will put all resources on terrorist organizations (e.g., electronic 
surveillance, cooperation with the Mexican government, and cooperation with Mexican 
law enforcement); this will deter the criminal organizations from working with the 
terrorist organizations” (Interview with senior homeland security official, April 7, 2009).  
The importance of working with the Mexican government and tightening up the 
U.S. borders is certainly part of the overall approach to thwarting the efforts by criminal 
and terrorist organizations intent on human smuggling. However it is also important to 
understand whether or not there is in fact a definitive relationship between these entities, 
and if so, how can homeland security and law enforcement personnel disrupt this 









The purpose of this thesis is to expand on the literature that has been written on 
the possibility and impact of a relationship forming between criminal and terrorist 
organizations in terms of human smuggling. Additionally, this relationship may be 
impacted by criminal organizations who attempt to influence or corrupt border agents 
along the U.S-Mexico border. Furthermore, criminal gangs like MS-13 and M-18 may 
hire themselves out to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S., which requires some 
type of relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations.  
This thesis seeks to answer whether or not there is a relationship between criminal 
and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. More specifically, will criminal 
and terrorist organizations cooperate to smuggle a terrorist operative across the U.S.-
Mexico border? If not, is there a possibility of a relationship between these two entities? 
Furthermore, how can homeland security and law enforcement personnel improve the 
information sharing process to prevent a criminal and terrorist organization from 
smuggling a terrorist operative across the U.S.-Mexico border? Lastly, in answering these 
questions and because corruption and criminal gangs (i.e., MS-13 and M-18) frequently 
become enmeshed in these relationships, they too will be discussed as partners in the 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations.   
According to 71 percent (10 out of 14) of the senior officials interviewed for this 
study, it is possible for a relationship to occur, or it is already occurring, between a 
criminal and terrorist organization. Furthermore, 100 percent (15 out of 15) of the senior 
officials believe it is possible that a criminal and terrorist organization could work 
together to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S. The most recent evidence of a 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling is 
provided by Kimery (2009), who reports that there is an alliance between terrorist 
organizations in Latin America, the Mexican drug cartels, and Muslim businessmen. 
These groups are reportedly collaborating with MS-13 and M-18 to smuggle Persons of 
Interest of Islamic Origin (PIIO) from terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah into 
the U.S. This would make sense due to the fact that the human smuggling routes between 
 80
the U.S. and Mexico will likely be exploited by terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and 
Hezbollah, who have taken refuge in the TBA of South America (Berry et al., 2003; 
Davidson II, 2005; Nuñez-Neto, Siskin, & Viña, 2005). This relationship is further 
evidenced by the fact that MS-13 and M-18 are involved in human smuggling and are 
working with organized criminal organizations in South America (Kane, 2006; Franco, 
2008).  
It is difficult to predict whether the relationship between criminal and terrorist 
organizations will be a one-time occurrence or more long-term. For example, in the case 
of Mahmoud Youssef Kourani and Salim Boughader Mucharrafille, it was clearly a long-
term relationship resulting in fund-raising for Hezbollah and the smuggling of hundreds 
of Lebanese across the U.S.-Mexico border, respectively (Arrillaga & Rodriguez, 2005). 
These two cases alone demonstrate the cooperation and relationship that occurs between 
criminal and terrorist organizations, and their ability to obtain fraudulent travel 
documents through bribery in order to get terrorists or terrorist sympathizers into the U.S. 
through the use of human smuggling.  
Through international cooperative efforts, the infiltration and disruption of 
transnational criminal gangs like MS-13 and M-18 may be the knock-out punch to any 
consideration they may give to current or future cooperation between criminal and 
terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. and Mexico must continue to tighten up the 
U.S.-Mexico border by ensuring that there are a sufficient number of border agents to 
absorb the ebb and flow of illegal migrants, ensure that the border wall is completed and 
maintained, and ensure that when a hole is plugged and a gap is filled, in terms of border 
security, that it remains that way indefinitely. The idea is that there would always be a 
concern that anyone who is provided protection by criminal gangs like MS-13 and M-18 
will be subject to being discovered and apprehended by law enforcement. 
Another devastating result of the relationship between criminal and terrorist 
organizations is the fact that they only need to spend approximately $3,000 to $5,000 to 
persuade a border official to allow a vehicle to pass through the border without being 
inspected. The rate of corruption has increased on the southwest border (Becker, 2008; 
Vartabedian, Serrano, & Marosi, 2006) and as more agents are added the Mexican drug 
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cartels are becoming more aggressive in their corruption efforts (Campo-Flores et al., 
2005; Becker, 2008). Furthermore, drug trafficking organizations are recruiting young 
men and women to join the Border Patrol to facilitate human smuggling activity and 
given the aggressive hiring efforts by DHS (six to eight thousand new agents between 
2007 and 2008) the opportunity for passing a background investigation with no 
derogatory information is increased (Interview with senior homeland security official, 
March 25, 2009; March 30, 2009).   
In order to prevent this from occurring, there must be regular, as well as 
unannounced, financial audits of personnel to determine if there is any unusual monetary 
activity. Furthermore, agencies must enhance their border corruption task force activities 
so that officers are deterred from this type behavior or as a worst case scenario caught 
before they can follow through with their efforts. Monitoring any unusual activity related 
to money, family, and promiscuity may provide early indicators that an officer is 
involved in behaviors that may have national security implications.    
Improvement in the information sharing process may be the single best way to 
detect the relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations and prevent them 
from smuggling a terrorist operative into the U.S. Information sharing works best once 
relationships are established and you have developed a level of trust (Christenson, 2007; 
Interview with senior homeland security official, April 1, 2007). One example of 
information sharing that may expose the relationship between criminal and terrorist 
organizations is illustrated by a cooperative effort between a county Sheriff and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The sheriff provides extra space in the jail 
so that ICE can screen incoming offenders for immigration related violations, which may 
lead to the discovery of affiliations with criminal or terrorist organizations (Interview 
with senior law enforcement official, April 3, 2009).     
In the end, without trust, cooperation, and information sharing between foreign, 
federal, state, local, and tribal entities none of the above mentioned actions will come to 
fruition. The ability to freely share sensitive and timely information is critical to 
disrupting criminal and terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the information sharing  
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systems must be compatible, secure, and easy to use. These systems will not replace 
personal relationships but will serve to enhance personal, inter and intra agency 
relationships, trust, and cooperation.   
A. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
Having first hand accounts from senior officials who have worked on the U.S.-
Mexico border for an average of 17.1 years proved to be invaluable in regards to 
answering the main questions of this thesis. Furthermore, the serendipitous introduction 
of information sharing as a way to determine the existence of a relationship between 
criminal and terrorist organizations was invaluable.  
The strengths of this research rest on the knowledge possessed by the senior 
officials that were interviewed for this thesis. For example, senior officials were able to 
identify nine different ways that would most likely be used by a terrorist to gain 
undetected entry into the U.S. This one element alone provides policy and decision 
makers with information that can be used immediately towards an enhanced border 
strategy or special operations to circumvent these methods of entry. Furthermore, 
knowing that human smuggling organizations are cooperating with criminal gangs and 
drug trafficking organizations is significant in that front-line personnel can probe the 
people that they apprehend for affiliations with these entities possibly uncovering 
evidence of ties with terrorist organizations.  
Also, the risk associated with corruption is significant for national security and 
knowing that money, family ties, and promiscuity are the primary reasons for corrupt 
behavior provides managers and leaders with known vulnerabilities that they can begin to 
address immediately. Furthermore, it became clear that Central and South America are 
safe havens for terrorist groups and are known for areas that supply fraudulent documents 
for entry into the U.S. Travel from these countries should serve as one of the indicators to 
border officials to take a closer look at the person’s travel documents, travel history, and 
reason for travel to ensure that the person has no nefarious intent. Lastly, the information 
gleaned from the literature review and three case examples corroborated the information 
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obtained from the interviews. That is, there does appear to be a relationship between 
criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling.  
While the data obtained from senior law enforcement officials was valuable, it 
does not come without limitations. The senior officials were told that the interviews 
would be conducted telephonically and they would be no longer than one-hour in 
duration. By conducting the interviews over the telephone, the researcher was not able to 
see the body language, facial expression, or mood of the person being interviewed. These 
nonverbal signs may have provided further insight into the person’s reaction to the 
interview questions. For example, if the person crossed their arms or was shaking their 
head one way or the other these could be indicators of a defensive or uncomfortable 
posture and affirmation of the question being asked, respectively. The length of the 
interview allowed for a limited amount of time for discussion on each one of the 
questions. That is, there was a limited amount of time allotted for probing deeper into a 
person’s response that may have provided further details or insight into a particular 
question. Also, the person being interviewed may have felt rushed by the time constraints 
thereby providing less thorough answers.  
Because the senior officials who were interviewed were all either homeland 
security or law enforcement officials, there may have been more subjectivity involved in 
answering the interview questions. That is, people in the law enforcement and homeland 
security profession are very passionate about their work, and anecdotally believe that 
terrorists are trying to enter the U.S. undetected, even though there may not be hard 
evidence. Furthermore, many of the senior officials interviewed had been exposed to 
information that is not generally available to the public, which may have tainted their 
answers in favor of the research question.  
There were approximately 13 questions that each senior official was asked to 
respond to. The fact that there was a set number and type of questions that were aimed at 
answering the questions being asked by this thesis limits the scope of the person’s 
responses and begins to shape how they answer the interview questions. That is, a 
predefined set of questions gets at a narrow band of information, whereas an open 
interview allows for a more free-flowing conversation with no parameters that limit the 
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amount and type of information discussed. Because the information being discussed was 
potentially revealing in terms of how terrorists may gain entry to the U.S., and 
consequently revealing of vulnerabilities that may exist with certain agencies charged 
with homeland security and border protection, there is a risk that the answers provided 
were given in a manner that would not unduly reveal criticisms of any one agency.  
A lot of the senior officials interviewed have a tremendous amount of law 
enforcement and homeland security activity and responsibility in their current positions 
that contributes to a hectic and fast paced daily schedule. This factor, along with the fact 
that the interview was not in person, may have contributed to an unintentional diminished 
attention to the interview because of distractions from their normal every day duties. 
Conversely, by volunteering to participate in this research project there may have been an 
unintentional increased motivation to answer the questions in a manner that was more 
favorable towards the overall research project.  
From an international perspective, it would have been useful to interview 
government and law enforcement officials in Mexico, Central America, and South 
America. Having this enhanced perspective broadens the scope and view of the 
relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling 
and may provide insight into how policy and decision makers can detect or disrupt these 
relationships. Furthermore, having access to the original case files on criminal, human 
smuggling, and terrorist cases may have provided further insight into how these entities 
are linked.  
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This research was undertaken to determine if there was a relationship between 
criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. An expansion on this 
question may be how to disrupt these entities once they are engaged in a relationship. 
Also, how can the U.S. strengthen the asylum laws to prevent what I refer to as legalized 
human smuggling? Furthermore, how can we detect travelers who have been fraudulently 
provided with genuine visas (i.e., they are not entitled to them)? Lastly, how can we 
better screen foreign students who are entering the U.S. with a clean record but are being 
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sent to the U.S. for the purpose of nefarious activities? All of these areas are worthy of 
study and will hopefully build upon the foundation of research that has already been 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 87
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, G. (1995). Common ground: Seeking consensus in Northern Ireland. Harvard  
International Review, 17(4), 42. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from ABI/INFORM 
Global database. (Document ID: 9296138). 
 
Archibold, R., & Becker, A. (2008, October 21). Former Border Agents Arrested. The  
New York Times, p. A.15. Retrieved November 22, 2008 from 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu/pqdweb?index=1&sid=1&s 
 
Arrillaga, P. & Rodriguez, O. (2005, July 3). The Nation; Porous Border is seen as  
Terrorist Threat; Pipelines in Canada and Latin America aid people from suspect 
nations, a probe finds. Los Angeles Times, p. A.1. Retrieved January 5, 2009, 
from ProQuest National Newspapers Core database. 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu/pqdweb?index=4&sid=1&s 
 
Bazar, E. (2009, March 6). Ultralight aircraft used in drug trafficking. USA Today.  
Retrieved August 1, 2009 from, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-03-
05-ultralight_N.htm 
 
Becker, A. (2008, November 10). Border Inspector Is Accused in Big Cocaine Case: 
[National Desk]. New York Times. Late Edition, p. A.17. Retrieved November 22, 
2008, from ProQuest National Newspapers Core database. (Document 
ID: 1591738901). 
 
Berry, L. B., Curtis, G., Hudson, R., Miro, R., Gibbs, J. N., Karacan, T., et al. (2003  
October). Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. The Library of 




Block, R. (2006, December 29). Criminal Intent: An L.A. Police Bust Shows New  
Tactics For Fighting Terror; Officers Use Local Laws To Arrest Small Offenders 
With High-Risk Potential; Foiling a Chechen 'Charity'. Wall Street Journal 
(Eastern Edition), p. A.1. Retrieved October 7, 2009, from ABI/INFORM Global. 
(Document ID: 1187000701). 
 
Border Officer Indicted for Allowing Illegal Aliens, Marijuana to be Smuggled into the  






Bruneau, T. (2005). The maras and national security in Central America. Strategic 




Burleigh, M. (2006, February). Sinister mutations. The Spectator. Retrieved April 20,  
2009, from Research Library database. (Document ID: 1074425571). 
 
Campo-Flores, A., Briscoe, D., Klaidman, D., Isikoff, M., Ordonez, J., Contreras, J., & 
Cruz, A. (2005, March 3). The most dangerous gang in America. Newsweek, 
145(13), 22-25. Retrieved November 16, 2008, from Business Source Complete 
database. 
 
Campo-Flores, A., Campbell, M., Kovach, G., & Gekas, A. (2007, July 16). Border 
Disorder. Newsweek, 150(3), 42-43. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from Business 
Source Complete database. 
   
Carter, S. (2009, March 27). Hezbollah uses Mexican drug routes into U.S. The  




Christenson, T. (2007, January 1). Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence  
Community Relationship. National Defense Intelligence College. Retrieved 
October 5, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/intel/nps35-020708-
04.pdf&code=97d17afc4def6abe5554f1bf41d9618f 
 
Crenshaw, M. (1981, July). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379- 
399. Retrieved April 28, 2009, from http://www.jstor.org/pss/421717 
 
Cruz, C. (2005, January). Al-Qaeda’s unlikely allies in Central America. The Terrorism 
Monitor, 3, 3-5. Retrieved July 12, 2008, from 
http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/ter_003_001.pdf 
 
Dangerous desert, breached border. (2005, January 8). Economist, Retrieved October 29,  
2008, from Business Source Complete database. 
 
Davidson II, T. S. (2005, November). Terrorism and human smuggling rings in South and  
Central America. The Terrorism Monitor, 22, 6-8. 
 
de Cordoba, J. (2001, November 16). South America's Muslim Traders Attract Antiterror  
Scrutiny --- Freewheeling Border Town Could Be Generating Funds For Militant 
Groups. Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), p. A.10. Retrieved October 7, 
2009, from ABI/INFORM Global. (Document ID: 90127086). 
 
 89
Della Porta, D. (1995). Political processes and institutions—Provisional Irish  
Republicans: An Oral and Interpretative History by Robert W. White / The 
Making of Terrorism by Michel Wieviorka. Contemporary Sociology, 24(4), 347. 
Retrieved April 20, 2009, from Research Library database. (Document 
ID: 6783785). 
 
DePasquale, R. (2005, August 30). Will militant splinter groups fill IRA vacuum? The  
Christian Science Monitor, p. 07. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from ProQuest 
National Newspapers Core database. (Document ID: 888901321). 
 
Five draw long sentences for terrorism scheme. (1987, December 31). Associated Press.  
Retrieved August 1, 2009 from, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/31/us/five-
draw-long-sentences-for-terrorism-scheme.html 
 
Former Border Patrol Agent Sentenced to More Than Four Years for Smuggling Aliens 
(2008, August 12). US Fed News Service, Including US State News. Washington, 
D.C. Retrieved November 22, 2008, from Research Library database. (Document 
ID: 1530123291). 
 
France, P. (2006, September 1). Preventing Terrorism Using Information Sharing  
Networks (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). Retrieved 




Franco, C. (2008). The MS-13 and 18th street gangs: Emerging transnational gang 
threats. CRS Report for Congress, RL34233. Congressional Research Service. 




Gardner, G., Killebrew, R., & Cope, J. (2009, July). Gangs, Drugs, Terrorism-and  
Information-sharing. Joint Force Quarterly, (54), 68-73. Retrieved October 5, 
2009, from Military Module. (Document ID: 1771541161). 
 
Gavin, P. (2000, June). Irish potato famine. The History Place. Retrieved April 24, 2009,  
from http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/famine/introduction.htm 
 
Hahn, K. S. (1989, September). Case Study: The Effects of the British Army against the  
Irish Republican Army. Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.). Retrieved  






Hall, R. (2005, May). On the money trail. The World Today, 61(5), 20-22. Retrieved  
April 20, 2009, from Research Library database. (Document ID: 839631111). 
 
Hutchinson, S., & O'Malley, P. (2007, December). A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on  
Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 30(12), 1095-1107. Retrieved October 6, 2008, 
doi:10.1080/10576100701670870 
 
Isaacson, J. & O’Connell, K. (2002). Beyond Sharing Intelligence, We Must Generate  
Knowledge. Rand Review, Vol. 26(2), p. 48-49. Retrieved September 23, 2009, 
from https://www.chds.us/courses/course/view.php?id=339 
 
Johnson, S. & Muhlhausen, D. B. (2005). North American Transnational Youth Gangs:  
Breaking the Chain of Violence. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 




Kahn, C. (2006, October 11). Corruption Compromises Border Security. National Public 
Radio Morning Edition. Retrieved November 22, 2008, from Research 
Library database. (Document ID: 1143932101). 
 
Kane, L. (2006, October/November). CBP confronts U.S.’s most dangerous gang. U.S.  
Customs and Border Protection Today. 
 
Kaplan, D. E., Fang, B., & Sangwan, S. (2005, December). Paying for Terror; How  
jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics--and profits--to finance attacks 
on targets around the globe; Afghanistan; India. U.S. News & World 
Report, 139(21), 40-54. Retrieved March 1, 2009, from ABI/INFORM 
Global database. (Document ID: 932654441). 
 
Keefer, S. L. (2006). Human trafficking and the impact on national security for the  
United States. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center.  
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448573 
 
Kimery, A. (2009, August). Unholy Trinity. Homeland Security Today Magazine, p. 24- 










Larence, E. (2008, July 23). Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be  
Achieved in Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide 
Implementation and Assess Progress, Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 




Lavery, B. (2006, February 2). I.R.A. Still Involved in Crime, Report Says, but Has  
Halted Terrorism. New York Times p. A9. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from 
ProQuest National Newspapers Core database. (Document ID: 979777831). 
 
Lyall, S. (1989, February 12). Suspected I.R.A. Member Arrested With Fake Bills. New  
York Times, p. A.38. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from ProQuest National 
Newspapers Core database. (Document ID: 961045461). 
 
Martin, K. (2009, March 18). Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National  
Security Studies, Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing 
and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, United States 
House of Representatives, “Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and 
Limitations.” Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C. Retrieved 
September 23, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/testimony/nps41-
040709-01.pdf&code=887e81cb6558421924069c11ce5087a2 
 
Mccarthy, T. (2001, June 11). The Coyote's Game. Time, 157(23), 56. Retrieved October 
28, 2008, from Business Source Complete database. 
 
McCaul, M. T. (2006). A line in the sand: Confronting the threat at the Southwest border. 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations. 
Retrieved October 29, 2008, from 
http://www.house.gov/mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf 
 
McDonald, H. (2009, March 18). Resistance will endure, warns Irish hardliner. The New  
Zealand Herald. Retrieved April 23, 2009, from 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10562191 
 
McNamara, T. (2006, May 10). Building on the Information Sharing Environment: 
Addressing Challenges of Implementation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment House 
Committee on Homeland Security. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 





Millman, J. (2007, October 25). Shift Is Afoot on Mexican Border. Wall Street Journal—
Eastern Edition, 250(98), A8. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from Business Source 
Complete database. 
 
Mincheva, L. & Gurr, T. R. (2006, March 24). UNHOLY ALLIANCES? How Trans- 
state Terrorism and International Crime Make Common Cause. Paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Panel on 
Comparative Perspectives on States, Terrorism and Crime. San Diego, California. 
 
Miro, R. J., & Curtis, G. E. (2003). Organized crime and terrorist activity in Mexico, 
1999-2002. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, the Library of 
Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime%5FMexico.pdf 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 
Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States : official government edition. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. 
G.P.O. 
 
National Gang Intelligence Center (2009). National Gang Threat Assessment 2009.  




Nojeim, G. (2009, March 18). Statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Director, Project on  
Freedom, Security & Technology, before the House Homeland Security 
Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism 
Risk Assessment, Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations. 




Nuñez-Neto, B., Siskin, A., & Viña, S. R. (2005). Border security apprehensions of 
"other than Mexican" aliens. CRS report for Congress, RL33097. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33097%5F20050922.pdf 
 
O'Kane, E. (n.d.). Anglo--Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: From  
Exclusion to Inclusion. Contemporary British History, 18(1), 78-99. Retrieved 
May 8, 2009, doi:10.1080/1361946042000217310 
 






O’Neil, S. (2007, May 24). Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for         
Congress. CRS report for Congress, RL34014. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 




Ordonez, K. J. (2008). Securing the United States-Mexico Border: An On-Going  
Dilemma. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Retrieved 
February 5, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps37-050508-
05.pdf&code=66ea90c4ab28058f6630bf76f8e39b7d 
 
Ponce, R. (2006). Honduras’ national security strategy to combat terrorism (Master’s 




Poveda, C.A. (2007). The likelihood of collaboration between Central American 
transnational gangs and terrorist organizations (Master’s Thesis, Naval 




Ribando, C. (2005). Gangs in Central America. CRS Report for Congress, RS22141. 




Ribando, C. (2008). Gangs in Central America. CRS report for Congress, RL34112. 




Seper, J. (2007, March 9). Officers outgunned on U.S. border. The Washington Times  
(DC), Retrieved October 29, 2008, from Regional Business News database. 
 
Seper, J. (2007, June 18). Guardsmen head to court in alien-smuggling case. The  
Washington Times (DC), Retrieved October 29, 2008, from Regional Business 
News database. 
 
Seper, J. (2007, December 7). Two held on alien smuggling charges. The Washington  
Times. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from Regional Business News database. 
 
Shelley, L. (n.d.). The nexus of organized international criminals and terrorism. Retrieved 
October 22, 2008, from http://pagesperso-
orange.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie/pdf/Intervention%20Shelley.pdf 
 94
Shelley, L. (1999). Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism (From  
Illicit Global Economy & State Power, p. 25-51, 1999, H. Richard Friman, Peter 
Andreas, eds. - See NCJ-179244). Transnational Organized Crime: The New 
Authoritarianism (From Illicit Global Economy & State Power, P 25-51, 1999, H. 
Richard Friman, Peter Andreas, eds. - See NCJ-179244), Retrieved October 8, 
2008, from SocINDEX with Full Text database. 
 
Shelley, L. (2005). The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.  
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 11(2), 101-111. Retrieved October 8, 2008, from 
SocINDEX with Full Text database. 
 
Shelley, L. & Picarelli, J. (2002). Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence  
of International Organized Crime and Terrorism. Police Practice and Research, 3 
(4), 305-318. Retrieved October 6, 2008, from 
http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/1561426022000032079 
 
Shelley, L., & Picarelli, J. (2005). Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between 
Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism. Trends in Organized 
Crime, 9(2), 52-67. Retrieved October 8, 2008, from SocINDEX with Full Text 
database. 
 
Stana, R. M. (2005). Combating alien smuggling. The federal response can be improved. 
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. GAO-
05-892T. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05892t.pdf 
 
Strickland, L. (2004). THE INFORMATION SHORTCOMINGS OF 9/11. Information  
Management Journal, 38(6), 34-44. Retrieved October 5, 2009, from 
ABI/INFORM Global. (Document ID: 745952611). 
 
Strindberg, A. (2003, March 1). Assessing the Hizbullah threat. Jane’s Intelligence  







Sullivan, J. (2006, August). Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Gangs. Global 




Sullivan, J., & Weston, K. (2006, August). Afterward: Law Enforcement Response 
Strategies for Criminal-states and Criminal-soldiers. Global Crime, 7(3/4), 615-
628. Retrieved October 21, 2008, doi:10.1080/17440570601073897 
 
Tama, J. (2005, October 1). Intelligence Reform: Progress, Remaining Deficiencies, and  
Next Steps. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 
Retrieved October 5, 2009, from 
http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/intel_reform.pdf 
 
Terror-Linked Migrants Channeled Into U.S. (2005, July 3). Associated Press. Retrieved  
January 15, 2009 from 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,161473,00.html 
 
Townsend, J. & Mili, H. (2008 May). Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An  
International Terrorist Security Risk? United States Military Academy CTC 




United States. (2000, September). No Information to Link Irish Terrorist Organizations to  
International Narcotics Trafficking. United States General Accounting Office. 




United States. (2002, November 25). Public Law 107-296: Homeland Security Act of  




United States. (2004, August 27). Executive Order 13356: Strengthening the Sharing of  
Terrorism Information to Protect Americans. Federal Register (September 1, 
2004), v.69 no.169, p.53599-53602. Office of the Federal Register. Retrieved 
September 23, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps17-
083004-03.pdf&code=887e81cb6558421924069c11ce5087a2 
 
United States. (2005a). Gangs and Crime in Latin America. Subcommittee on the  
Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations House of 







United States. (2005b). Threat Convergence at the Border: How Can We Improve the 
Federal Effort to Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations? Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: 




United States. (2006a). Checking Terrorism at the Border. Hearing before the  
Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee 
on International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office.  
 
United States. (2006b). Hezbollah’s Global Reach. Joint Hearing before  
the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 





United States. (2007). National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes  
and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing. Retrieved 
September 24, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps22-
110107-01.pdf&code=517f5115b14ed9568b523c2e79df50a0 
 
United States. (2008a). United States Intelligence Community Information  
Sharing Strategy. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Retrieved 




United States. (2008b). Information Sharing Environment: Definition of the Results  
to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to 
Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, Report to Congressional Requesters. 










United States. (2008c). Testimony of John McKay Former United States  
Attorney For the Western District of Washington, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved September 
25, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/legis/nps43-092608-
04.pdf&code=a05afc3441b5f431f1398f32ea9fa6f5 
 
United States. (2008d). Testimony of Russell M. Porter Director, State of  
Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center, Iowa Department of Public Safety; and General 
Chairman, Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU), Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, Wednesday, “A Report Card on Homeland Security Information 
Sharing.” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved September 
25, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/legis/nps43-092608-
05.pdf&code=a05afc3441b5f431f1398f32ea9fa6f5 
 
United States. (2009a). FY2010 Budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis  
of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing before the United States House 
of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment. Washington, 




United States. (2009b). Seven charged with terrorism violations in North  
Carolina. Department of Justice press release. Retrieved August 1, 2009 from, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html 
 
United States Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (2007, July  
18). U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal gangs from Central 




United States of America versus Mahmoud Youssef Kourani (2003, November). United  
States District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, Criminal 
Indictment. Retrieved September 15, 2009, from 
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index2.html 
 
Vardi, N. (2006, August 14). Hezbollah's Hoard. Forbes, 178(3), 46-46. Retrieved March  






Vartabedian, R., Serrano, R. A., & Marosi, R. (2006, October 23). The Long, Crooked 
Line; Rise in Bribery Tests Integrity of U.S. Border; From California to Texas, 
200 officials indicted since 2004; Targeted by Smugglers; Some fear the 
corruption is `the tip of the iceberg.' :[HOME EDITION]. Los Angeles Times, 
p. A.1. Retrieved November 22, 2008, from Los Angeles Times database. 
(Document ID: 1149588161). 
 
Washington Office on Latin America. (2008, May). Central American gang-related 
asylum: A resource guide. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Weinberg, L. (1991, July). Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political  
Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities. Comparative Politics, 23(4), 423-438. 
Retrieved April 28, 2009, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/422258 
 
Westphal, S. P. (2000, February 11). Fighting the fakes. Los Angeles Times, B-2. 
Retrieved November 1, 2008, from 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/11/local/me-63287 
 
White, T. J. (1997). Law, the state, and Republicanism in Ireland. The Journal of Social,  
Political, and Economic Studies, 22(4), 417-432. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from 
ABI/INFORM Global database. (Document ID: 25647418). 
 
Wilson, G. & Sullivan, J. (2007). On Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism. Defense and the 
National Interest. Retrieved October 24, 2008, from http://d-n-
i.net/fcs/pdf/wilson_sullivan_gangs_terrorism.pdf 
 
Wishart, E. (2002, December 1). Intelligence Networks and the Tri Border Area of South  
America: The Dilemma of Efficiency Versus Oversight (Master’s Thesis, Naval 




Zambelis, C. (2005, December 2). Radical Islam in Latin America. Terrorism Monitor,  
v.3 no.23, p.9-12. Jamestown Foundation (Washington, D.C.). Retrieved October 
2, 2009, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps38-121208-
01.pdf&code=daaaeb688d1d6cbe6e0c7d33e950bf7d 
 
Zegart, A. B. (2007). Spying blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11. Princeton,  
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 99
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
